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Olympians as Laborers: How Unionizing
Can Help Athletes Bargain for
Compensation and Better Structural Support
Sherif Farrag*
Team USA athletes suffer poor structural support and inadequate compensation despite constituting irreplaceable labor for the
multi-billion-dollar Olympic sports industry. This poor support is
evident in recent complaints made by Olympic stars of the poor mental health support provided by the United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee and in its failure to prevent nearly two decades
of sexual abuse perpetrated on USA Gymnastics gymnasts. The inadequate compensation is apparent as athletes continue to receive
no wages for their participation in the Olympics or Olympic-sanctioned events, generally struggle financially, and face restrictions
on licensing their name, image, and likeness to partners during the
Olympics. Theoretically, athletes can challenge some of these problems through antitrust or employment law claims. However, relevant case law makes those paths difficult, at best. Several circuits
have found an antitrust exemption for the United States Olympic &
Paralympic Committee and similarly situated National Collegiate
Athletic Associate athletes have failed thus far to hold the Association liable for wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The best
path athletes can take to improve their lot comprehensively and holistically is labor law. Unionization can empower athletes to directly
negotiate with the United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee
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in search of better structural support and adequate wages. The unionization process, however, will most likely result in athletes of
many, but not all, sports gaining the ability to unionize. Others will
fail to qualify as employees under the National Labor Relations Act
or will be exempt as “independent contractors.” Nonetheless, labor
law is the most appropriate and efficient way to improve the lot of
Team USA athletes as they pursue their dreams.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2012, a group of around seventy people embarked from
northern Africa in an attempt to cross the Mediterranean and reach
Europe.1 Unfortunately, the boat ran out of gasoline mid-route and
drifted in open water until an Italian rescue ship came across it.2
Although the ship threw out ropes to assist the passengers, at least
one person drowned in the process.3 The decedent’s story is not rare:
thousands of people from poverty-stricken, warring, or oppressive
regions of Africa drown in attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea.4
But the death of Samia Omar, a passenger on the 2012 ship, was
1

Heather Saul, Samia Omar, the Displaced but Determined Olympic Athlete Who
Drowned Trying to Cross the Med, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 6, 2016, 2:47 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/samia-omar-the-olympic-athlete-whodrowned-while-trying-to-cross-the-mediterranean-a7175961.html
[https://perma.cc/55JM-XEQF].
2
Id.
3
Teresa Krug, The Story of Samia Omar, the Olympic Runner Who Drowned in the
Med, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/
03/the-story-of-samia-omar-the-olympic-runner-who-drowned-in-the-med
[perma.cc/48UR-QYJC].
4
Samantha Raphelson, More than 3,100 Migrants Died Crossing Mediterranean in
2017, NPR (Jan. 6, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/06/
576223035/more-than-3-100-migrants-died-crossing-mediterranean-in-2017
[https://perma.cc/27VZ-H6AE].
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unique because Omar was an Olympic sprinter.5 Even more surprising was that Omar risked her life by boarding an overcrowded boat
in the perilous waters of the Mediterranean—one of the deadliest
routes to Europe—in hopes of securing adequate training and financial support prior to the London Olympics.6 Being an Olympian did
not save Omar from financial insecurity. After her unnecessary
death, Omar’s sister Hodan relayed that “[Samia] decided to go by
boat, and we told her not to, and my mother tried to tell her not to . . .
[b]ut Samia was very determined and asked for our mother’s forgiveness, and my mother gave it, and she took the boat, and she
died.”7
Financial needs encumber both Olympians and Olympic hopefuls alike, irrespective of whether they reside in Somalia or the
United States. Many American athletes have spoken out in support
of changing the structural support system and revenue distribution
policies of the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee
(“USOPC”), previously the United States Olympic Committee
(“USOC”).8 In this Note, the phrase “structural support system” refers to governance structures, such as policies and standard operating procedures, that aim to protect an athlete’s physical, emotional,
and mental well-being. Regarding the USOPC system, Michael
Phelps stated that the committee “hasn’t done anything to help [athletes] transition after an Olympics.”9 Basketball players Ray Allen
5

Teresa Krug, Grieving for Somali Olympian Samia Omar, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 27,
2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/sport/olympics/2012/08/2012826142635318631.html
[https://perma.cc/3UPC-J68A]. Samia Omar competed in the 200-meter race at the 2008
Beijing Olympics. Id.
6
Saul, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
See David Zirin & Jules Boykoff, Olympic Workers of the World Unite!, NATION (Apr.
29, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/ioc-finances-study/ [https://
perma.cc/GAD3-CV3N]; see also Lynn Zinser, Wade, Allen Want to Be Paid to Play in
Olympics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012, 5:45 PM), https://offthedribble.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/04/11/wade-allen-want-to-be-paid-to-play-in-olympics/
[https://perma.cc/Y9293YGF]. The name change occurred in 2019 to celebrate Paralympic athletes. Mark Jones,
U.S. Olympic Committee Changes Name to U.S. Olympic & Paralympic Committee, TEAM
USA (June 20, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.teamusa.org/media/news/usopc/062019US-Olympic-Committee-changes-name-to-US-Olympic-and—Paralympic-Committee
[https://perma.cc/EQZ8-GTN9].
9
Cindy Boren, ‘I Straight Wanted to Die’: Michael Phelps Wants USOC to Help
Athletes
Cope
with
Depression,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
28,
2018),
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and Dwyane Wade both specifically spoke out at the London 2012
Olympics about the lack of compensation for Olympic participation.10 Wade said, “[i]t’s a lot of things you do for the Olympics . . .
.We play the whole summer. I do think guys should be compensated.
Just like I think college players should be compensated as well.”11
He explained that being compensated is not in opposition with playing for love or patriotism.12 Clarifying himself on Twitter, Wade
wrote, “[w]hat I was referencing is there is a lot of Olympic business
that happens that athletes are not a part of . . . .”13
While Wade and Allen do not receive compensation for Olympic participation, they do make a living through the National Basketball Association.14 Most Olympic athletes, however, are not so
lucky. There are approximately 15,000 athletes in every Olympic
event, many of whom earn very little from their athletic abilities.15
For example, only half of the top ten nationally ranked U.S. track
and field athletes make more than $15,000 annually from the sport.16
Others in more obscure sports make no money at all.17 Olympic athletes and hopefuls generally survive through a hodge-podge of parttime jobs, grants, prize money, and/or apparel contracts.18 There are
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2018/03/28/i-straight-wanted-todie-michael-phelps-wants-usoc-to-help-athletes-cope-with-depression/
[https://perma.cc/H6D2-RQQD].
10
See Andy Hutchins, Dwayne Wade, Ray Allen Think They Should Be Paid to Play for
Team USA, SBNATION (Apr. 11, 2012, 5:42 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2012/
4/11/2942084/dwyane-wade-ray-allen-olympics-pay-team-usa [https://perma.cc/N2Q78N2F].
11
Michael Wallace, Dwayne Wade Eyes Olympic Pay, ESPN (Apr. 11, 2012),
https://www.espn.com/nba/truehoop/miamiheat/story/_/id/7801502/nba-olympianscompensated [https://perma.cc/7DRA-YGTC].
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See Miami HEAT Salary Archive—2012/13, BASKETBALL INSIDERS,
http://www.basketballinsiders.com/miami-heat-team-salary/miami-heat-salary-archive201213/ [https://perma.cc/G5RR-A9S7] (Aug. 19, 2021).
15
Adam Taylor, Here’s How Much Olympic Athletes Really Get Paid, BUS. INSIDER
(Jul. 19, 2012, 10:26 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-olympicathletes-really-get-paid-2012-7 [https://perma.cc/DT5F-4L49].
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Charles Riley, Olympians Face Financial Hardship, CNN MONEY (July 10, 2012,
5:37 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2012/07/10/news/economy/olympic-athletes-financial/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/M38J-C5UA].
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numerous documented incidents of Olympic hopefuls applying for
food stamps and unemployment assistance.19 Further, many can be
found sleeping on friends or relatives’ couches because they cannot
afford rent.20 Even though their performances in a globally televised
sports extravaganza create billions of dollars in revenue, many athletes are close to poverty.21 The reason lies in the compensation system that the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) uses to pay
athletes. The system can be summarized in a few words: there is not
one.22 Despite the IOC generating an average of more than a billion
dollars per year, no money goes directly to the athletes as payments
for their performances.23 Instead, IOC revenues are filtered through
various parties, such as international sports federations, National
Olympic Committees, and National Governing Bodies (“NGBs”),
with some money going indirectly to fund athletic training for the
next Olympic cycle.24
Looking at 2016 alone, the IOC made $3.56 billion in profits,
mostly from television deals.25 The IOC spent $2.85 billion of that
amount, with $2.03 billion going to National Olympic Committees
and other sporting federations, for each Olympic sport.26 These

19

See Tim Struby, Rower Megan Kalmoe Is an Olympic Medalist—and She Lives Just
Above the Poverty Line, ESPN (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/
story/_/id/15421001/us-rower-megan-kalmoe-money-struggles-olympians
[https://perma.cc/Q96K-8BLP].
20
Id.
21
See Rachel Axon, Can Olympic Organizers Be Trusted to Make the Right Call on
Tokyo Games?, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2020, 6:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/olympics/2020/03/16/olympics-can-organizers-trusted-make-right-calltokyo-games/5049637002/ [https://perma.cc/9F3D-JV8Y] (noting that the 2012–2016
cycle, the IOC made more than $4 billion in revenue just from broadcast rights).
22
How Olympic Athletes Make a Living, SPORTS MGMT. DEGREE HUB,
https://www.sportsmanagementdegreehub.com/olympic-athletes-salaries/
[https://perma.cc/QS8V-X22M].
23
Mark Cuban, Some Olympic Thoughts, BLOG MAVERICK (Apr. 22, 2012),
https://blogmaverick.com/2012/04/22/some-olympic-thoughts/ [https://perma.cc/J25L3NZW].
24
Emma Baccellieri, Where Does the IOC’s Money Go?, DEADSPIN (Feb. 13, 2018,
11:00 PM), https://deadspin.com/where-does-the-iocs-money-go-1822983686 [https://
perma.cc/3BYX-ZTL9].
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also Angela Gamalski, An Olympic Joke: Sanctioning the Olympic Movement,
27 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 305, 314 (2019).

2022]

OLYMPIANS AS LABORERS

695

organizations purport to use the money to “promote and protect the
Olympic movement,”27 but often engage in corruption.28 For instance, members of multiple National Olympic Committees sold
Olympic event tickets on the black market, even though the IOC
provided the tickets for distribution to athletes’ relatives and
friends.29 In another example, a group of Moldovan athletes and
coaches alleged that the Moldovan Olympic Committee took commissions on Olympic Solidarity payments earmarked for Moldovan
athletes.30 These stories represent only a fraction of the corrupt dealings that reduce the benefits and funds rightfully belonging to athletes. The number of public corruption claims is not exponentially
larger because athletes know their allegations would (and do) result

27

National Olympic Committees, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., https://www.olympic.org/iocgovernance-national-olympic-committees [https://perma.cc/F5BG-ZT4G].
28
See Justin Mattingly, Q&A: Why Are Corruption and the Olympics So Tied Together?,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.richmond.com/sports/q-a-whyare-corruption-and-the-olympics-so-tied/article_2cff458e-6bf1-5d2c-9a0bf905a9d719d4.html [https://perma.cc/BZM6-SGLH].
29
The official athletes’ guide encouraged the athletes to acquire their allotted tickets
from their National Olympic Committees. See LONDON ORG. COMM. OF THE OLYMPIC
GAMES & PARALYMPIC GAMES, LONDON 2012 ATHLETES’ AND TEAM OFFICIALS’ GUIDE
(2012); Allegations of Black Market for Olympic Tickets, CBS NEWS (June 16, 2012, 9:07
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/allegations-of-black-market-for-olympic-tickets/
[https://perma.cc/8EG3-4EQV]; IOC Probes London Games Ticket Allegations,
ALJAZEERA (June 16, 2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/06/
2012616223444340456.html [https://perma.cc/D478-BXTN]; Louise Ridley, Inquiry
Launched into NOC Olympic Ticket Corruption, CAMPAIGN (June 18, 2012),
https://www.campaignlive.com/article/inquiry-launched-noc-olympic-ticketcorruption/1136838 [https://perma.cc/H4J6-Z9RK].
30
Liam Morgan, Group of Athletes and Coaches Make Corruption Allegations Against
National Olympic Committee of the Republic of Moldova, INSIDE THE GAMES (July 28,
2019), https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1082759/moldova-noc-facing-corruptionclaims [perma.cc/D8X7-SZ8Z]; Moldova: National Olympic Committee Accused of
Stealing Money, Intended for Athletes, REG’L ANTI- CORRUPTION INITIATIVE (Aug. 2017),
http://www.rai-see.org/moldova-national-olympic-committee-accused-of-stealingmoney-intended-for-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/K3M7-78YP]; see also Gamalski, supra
note 26, at 309–10; Brian Alexander, It’s Time to Disband the U.S. Olympic Committee,
OUTSIDE (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.outsideonline.com/culture/opinion/usoc-has-longway-go/ [https://perma.cc/9K8K-HZZ6] (criticizing athlete support structures and lack of
compensation).
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in official or unofficial suspension—or, more discreetly, deselection
from tournaments and a “coincidental” scarcity of training funds.31
Due to the monopolistic nature of the Olympic movement and
IOC policies that give organizations such as international sports federations, National Olympic Committees, and NGBs great power,
athletes are left without much ability to determine their structural
support system or to receive adequate compensation. One recent example of inadequate structural support is the USOPC and USA
Gymnastics’ (“USAG”) cataclysmic failure to prevent nearly two
decades of sexual abuse by a sanctioned team physician.32 The athletes’ inability to craft an adequate support system or receive direct
compensation for their labor is in stark contrast with their integral
place in Olympic revenue generation.33 With specific regard to the
American Olympic movement, there are two major problems that
U.S. Olympians and hopefuls face (collectively “National Team
Members”).34 The first is an inadequate structural support system on
31

See Alexandra Starr, Olympic Athletes Fear Retaliation If They Speak Out, NPR (July
25, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/25/631581295/olympic-athletes-fearretaliation-if-they-speak-out
[https://perma.cc/HT63-J49Z].
Three-time
shooting
Olympian Keith Sanderson discussed athlete grievances in an interview, saying, “[The
USOPC] have a total monopoly on who the Olympians are,” and that was the reason
athletes feared speaking publicly. Id. After this interview, he says he was suspended and
locked out of the U.S. Olympic training center as retaliation. Id. Triathlete Steve Sexton
said he experienced retaliation as well. Id. He was removed in 2016 from his role as an
elected athlete representative at USA Triathlon after he lobbied Congress for Olympic
reform. Other athletes choose to remain silent. Id.
32
See Marc Edelman & Jennifer M. Pacella, Vaulted into Victims: Preventing Further
Sexual Abuse in U.S. Olympic Sports Through Unionized and Improved Governance, 61
ARIZ. L. REV. 463, 463 (2019).
33
See Starr, supra note 31.
34
In this Note, National Team Members means national team members of all the NGBs.
The author uses this particular grouping to signify “Olympians and Olympic hopefuls”
because generally speaking, Olympic selection is narrower than National Team selection.
As a result, National Team Members are made up of Olympians and Olympic hopefuls.
National Teams compete in various competitions, including World Championships of their
sport, but selection for the Olympics, the most prestigious tournament for most Olympic
sports, is made by selecting certain members of the National Team. Because National Team
Members, even before they become Olympians, make great sacrifices to qualify for the
Olympics, later in this Note, “National Team Members” will constitute the appropriate
bargaining unit for unionization purposes. See, e.g., Nicole Jomantas, Meet Team USA’s
Olympic Fencing Qualifiers, USA FENCING (Apr. 14, 2021, 1:30 PM),
https://www.usafencing.org/news_article/show/1158021 [https://perma.cc/Y76T-9KMN];
Men’s
Foil,
USA
FENCING,
https://www.usafencing.org/selection-criteria
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the NGB and USOPC level, which leads to abuses such as those
perpetrated by former USAG physician Larry Nassar.35 The second
is financial: the USOPC fails to directly compensate National Team
Members which leads to impoverishment for some and financial
struggle for most. Both problems are rooted in athlete powerlessness
and a completely lopsided power dynamic between athletes and the
managers and owners of the Olympic movement.
This Note argues that athletes must find a way to bargain for a
more athlete-centered structural support system and for fairer, more
direct forms of compensation. To accomplish these goals, some legal paths are much better than others. Antitrust law is probably the
least promising path.36 Multiple circuit courts have clearly stated
that the USOPC enjoys an implicit exemption from antitrust laws.37
One plausible but still unfavorable path is employment law.38 National Team Members would have to argue in court that they are, as
athletes funded by the USOPC, employees of the Olympic committee and thus subject to minimum wage and employment law protections. Unfortunately, this path is problematic, especially considering
the recent failure of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) athlete employment lawsuits.39 The third and most
promising path is athlete unionization.40 Although NGB National
Team Members have never attempted unionization, case law indicates that National Team Members of at least some NGBs can successfully unionize.41 Unionization facilitates collective bargaining,
giving athletes the power to bargain for an adequate structural support system and more direct methods of compensation. In Part I, this
[https://perma.cc/3M5X-NYLF] (demonstrating how the USA Fencing Olympic team
selection excludes some athletes who qualify for the National Team competing at Senior
World Championships).
35
See Who Is Larry Nassar? A Timeline of His Decades-Long Career, Sexual Assault
Convictions and Prison Sentences, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/pages/
interactives/larry-nassar-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/W9CL-AH6E].
36
See infra Part I.D.1.
37
See Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 899 F.3d 712, 715–17 (9th Cir. 2018);
see also Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n of U.S., 884 F.2d 524, 525 (10th Cir. 1989);
JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006).
38
See infra Part I.D.2.
39
See infra Part II.B.
40
See infra Part II.
41
See infra Part III.
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Note describes the background, history, and evolution of Olympic
amateurism and how it has contributed to athletes’ current financial
problems and disempowerment. Part II discusses how the law, including antitrust and employment law, fails to assist athletes in gaining financial stability and other forms of empowerment. Part III argues that labor law would allow athletes to bargain for a stronger
structural support system and greater financial compensation. It then
explains the intricacies of why, under labor law, athletes for some
sports can successfully unionize.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Evolution of Olympic Athlete Amateurism
The USOPC’s failure to pay athletes for their participation in
Olympic games, in tandem with the Olympic movement’s singular
focus on athletic performance to the detriment of athletes’ well-being, are major reasons for their discontent.42 Such practices are
linked to the concept of amateurism–—the practice of sport for
“sport’s sake,” instead of compensation.43 Some have argued this
idea dates back to the ancient Hellenistic Olympics.44 However, Professor David C. Young of the University of Florida and others have
largely debunked this belief.45 Young writes of “no mention of amateurism in Greek sources, no reference to amateur athletes, and no
evidence that the concept of ‘amateurism’ was even known in antiquity.”46 In effect, there were no known bars to compensation in the
ancient Greek games.47 Instead, modern amateurism began in the

42

See Sally Jenkins, Michael Phelps Says Olympians Face Greater Mental Health Risks.
Does the USOPC Care?, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/olympics/michael-phelps-says-olympians-face-greater-mental-health-risks-doesthe-usopc-care/2020/02/11/72afec9c-4ce9-11ea-b721-9f4cdc90bc1c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8L3A-9NBY].
43
Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining
Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 560 (2009).
44
See Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition, 28
STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 181, 184 (2017).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Fitt, supra note 43, at 560.
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high-class English society of the early 1800s.48 Likely as a means to
exclude the masses from participation, young aristocratic men espoused the notion that glory, not compensation, was the only true
athletic motivation.49 As such, aristocratic amateurs became true
sportsmen while the working class were lowly “professionals,”50 as
they could not afford to devote many hours to an “amateur” sport.51
The aristocracy viewed professionals as being of “questionable
character.”52 Sports historian Allen Guttmann of Amherst College
concurs with this general premise.53 He asserts that the Victorian
middle and upper classes invented amateurism to “exclude the
‘lower orders’ from the play of the leisure class.”54 Noted sports law
author Kenneth Shropshire expounded on this point: when “an amateur lost a contest to a working man he lost more than the race . . .
he lost his identity . . . his life’s premise disappeared; namely that
he was innately superior to the working man in all ways.”55
This nineteenth century amateurism ideal became foundational
for the Olympic movement, despite the reality that engaging in contests for money was the dominant societal practice in western Europe.56 Not only did the Olympic movement fail to pay athletes, but
it prevented professionals from competing altogether.57 The 1892
inaugural Olympic congress redefined amateurism to restrict those
who profited from competing in a sport.58 This rule, of course, resulted in the exclusion of the working class who, unlike the upper

48

Crabb, supra note 44, at 184.
Id.
50
Professor Kenneth Shropshire of Arizona State University explained that in Victorian
England, “professional” became indicative of one’s lower social class. See id. at 184–85.
51
Id. at 184.
52
Id.
53
See L.A. Jennings, For Love or for Money: A History of Amateurism in the Olympic
Games, VICE (June 7, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvaqdm/forlove-or-for-money-a-history-of-amateurism-in-the-olympic-games
[https://perma.cc/9BEQ-VWJV].
54
Id.
55
Crabb, supra note 44.
56
See id.
57
Jennings, supra note 53.
58
Id.
49
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classes, could not afford to devote hours training and competing for
free.59
In 1981, the IOC dropped the word “amateur” from the Olympic
Charter, allowing international sports federations to determine their
own eligibility rules for each sport.60 This did not mean that the IOC
or National Olympic Committees paid athletes; rather, athletes who
previously received payment for athletic performance (i.e., professionals) became eligible for the Olympics in some sports, depending
on each international sports federation’s decision. Basketball inaugurated its first “professional” team in 1992.61 The “Dream Team”
included Michael Jordan, Charles Barkley, and Larry Bird and rendered the Olympics an even greater international spectacle (naturally generating more revenue).62 When the International Boxing
Association allowed professional boxers to compete in 2016, the
Olympic movement became fully open to professional athletes’ participation.63 Even though the IOC never compensated athletes for
such participation, the eligibility of professional athletes diluted the
original amateurism ethos. The Olympics is no longer about amateur
athletes in a traditional sense. It has transformed into athletes being
“amateur” for the sake of patriotism.64 Instead of playing for money,
Olympic athletes “patriotically” play for their countries.
59

See id.
See Crabb, supra note 44, at 187.
61
See id. This team was not compensated for their labor in the way that workers, or
professional athletes, normally are. See Thomas Heath, Win or Lose, Dream Team Strikes
Gold, WASH. POST (May 15, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1996/05/15/win-or-lose-dream-team-strikes-gold/92a886b5-892d-4854-90c5ac37a3aaf9d6/ [https://perma.cc/ZA3J-WS39]. “Professionals” delineates a team of
players who were previously paid to play basketball, such as by the NBA. See Bob Greene,
What Changed the Olympics Forever, CNN (July 23, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/
2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs/index.html [https://perma.cc/5L77-95B6].
62
Crabb, supra note 44, at 187; Bill Bender, Inside the ‘Dream Team’: A Complete
Roster & History of USA’s 1992 Olympic Men’s Basketball Team, SPORTING NEWS (May
6, 2020), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nba/news/dream-team-roster-history-usa1992-olympics/4o78v2slilky1inrskk8h6wkb [https://perma.cc/M4LJ-PUDE].
63
See Crabb, supra note 44, at 187.
64
For a discussion of patriotism and the Olympics, see Kathleen E. Powers, Do the
Olympics Promote Nationalism—and International Conflict? Here’s the Research., WASH.
POST (July 26, 2021, 7:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/26/doolympics-promote-nationalism-international-conflict-heres-research/
[https://perma.cc/2RV3-HRVC].
60

2022]

OLYMPIANS AS LABORERS

701

In 2019, yet another change occurred that impacted athletes. The
IOC allowed athletes to use their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”)
in limited fashion during the Olympics to advertise for independent
entities.65 The IOC altered Rule 40, a thirty-year old rule that protects official Olympic sponsors by restricting athletes’ abilities to
use their NIL rights to advertise for any other entity.66 The amended
rule states: “[c]ompetitors . . . may allow their person, name, picture
or sports performances to be used for advertising purposes during
the Olympic Games in accordance with the principles determined
by the IOC Executive Board.”67 The amendment delegated specific
processes to the National Olympic Committees.68 The USOPC, for
example, gave its own guidance outlining a process of registration
and compliance for each athlete and their personal sponsors.69 As a
result, U.S. athletes can now provide and receive congratulatory
messages from personal sponsors during the Games.70 Athletes’
commercial partners can also engage in generic advertising during
the Olympics.71 Olympic and national team logos remain off-limits
to sponsors and are subject to penalties if they violate the terms of
the revised Rule 40 arrangement.72
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Jia Jung, A Relaxed Rule 40 Will Allow Athletes Greater Endorsement Opportunities
at Tokyo Games, SWIMMING WORLD (May 24, 2021, 5:11 AM),
https://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/a-relaxed-rule-40-will-allow-athletesgreater-endorsement-opportunities-at-tokyo-games/ [https://perma.cc/64TZ-C9WH].
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Id.
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Michael Pavitt, Rule 40 Guidelines to Be Sent to NOCs as IOC Claim Balance
Reached Between Athletes and Commercial Rights, INSIDE THE GAMES (June 27, 2019),
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1081272/rule-40-guidelines-to-be-sent-to-nocsas-ioc-claim-balance-reached-between-athletes-and-commercial-rights
[https://perma.cc/79U3-FCYJ].
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U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., RULE 40 GUIDANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES 2
(2019),
https://www.teamusa.org/Team-USA-Athlete-Services/Athlete-Marketing//media/18EB7B007444471AA81FF5B4296A0430.ashx [https://perma.cc/5ZP3-3H3X].
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Ed Dixon, US Olympians Able to Promote Personal Sponsors as Rule 40 Is Relaxed,
SPORTSPRO (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/team-usa-usopcolympics-rule-40-athletes-sponsorship-tokyo-2020-ioc [https://perma.cc/DFT2-F57M].
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Id.
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See James Johnston, Wait, There’s a Catch: Rule 40 Personal Sponsor Commitment
Issued Ahead of 2020 Tokyo Olympics, GALA L. (Feb. 12, 2020), http://blog.galalaw.com/
post/102fyop/wait-theres-a-catch-rule-40-personal-sponsor-commitment-issued-ahead-of2020-t [https://perma.cc/B2GF-DEKH].
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B. Athlete Grievances: An Inadequate Structural Support System
and Compensation
Athletes’ new ability to license their NIL was merely a minor
change and did not resolve the two main problems athletes face.
Athletes still have trouble collecting compensation to prepare for
and compete in the Olympic Games.73 Further, the structural support
system does not prioritize athletes’ health and well-being.74
Due to the lack of an Olympic compensation structure, some athletes necessarily resort to food stamps, part-time jobs, and loans
from relatives for support.75 Even in the era of billion-dollar television contracts, rower Caroline Lind, winner of two gold medals in
2008 and 2012, struggled on $12,000 per year earned from babysitting work.76 The Track and Field Athletes Association found that
half the athletes highly ranked in their sport only earned about
$15,000 annually from all income sources.77 Witnessing and experiencing this lopsidedness, Olympian August L. Wolf lobbied Congress to no avail for legislation requiring or incentivizing the distribution of half of USOPC’s revenue directly to Team USA athletes
and coaches for income, training, and medical care.78
One retort to allegations of exploitation is that athletes do receive funding through the USOPC and indirectly through NGBs.79
This funding is not described by the USOPC and NGBs as a “wage”

73

See How Olympic Athletes Make a Living, supra note 22.
See Matthew Futterman, Michael Phelps: ‘I Can’t See Any More Suicides,’ N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/sports/olympics/michaelphelps-documentary-weight-of-gold.html [https://perma.cc/59XR-UNVM].
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August L. Wolf, Opinion, U.S. Olympic Committee Has Run off the Rails. Time to
Refocus on Putting Athletes First, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2018, 11:20 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/02/olympic-committee-gymnasticssex-scandal-pay-athletes-column/476965002/ [https://perma.cc/7HVP-HDZB].
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Kurt Badenhausen, The Highest-Paid Athletes at the Rio Summer Olympics, FORBES
(Aug. 3, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2016/08/03/thehighest-paid-summer-olympic-athletes-at-rio/#6eaaf0dd1584
[https://perma.cc/JV79EUHZ].
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Wolf, supra note 75.
79
See Will Hobson, USOPC Asked for $200 Million in the Coronavirus Stimulus Bill to
‘Sustain American Athletes,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/03/26/usopc-asked-200-million-federal-stimulusmoney/ [https://perma.cc/86AS-82GW].
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or a “salary,” but is instead characterized as a “stipend” or “award”
to encourage training in preparation for the next Olympic Games.80
Such stipends and awards do not adequately reflect the value of
these athletes to IOC revenue generation.81 While professional
league athletes receive nearly fifty percent of revenues, Olympic
athletes globally receive less than ten percent of IOC revenues.82 In
fact, a study by the U.S. Athlete Trust found that the USOPC distributed less than six percent of its revenues to athletes in 2012.83 In
2016, the USOPC increased that number to a paltry seven to eight
percent.84
In addition to exploitation, athletes struggle due to the lack of
adequate structural mechanisms to support their health and well-being. Speaking about the mental illness that he and other athletes experienced over their careers, swimming legend Michael Phelps said,
“looking back on my career, I don’t think anybody really cared to
help us . . . [a]s long as we were performing, I don’t think anything
else really mattered.”85 As of July 2020, the USOPC has merely
three mental health officers on its staff—theoretically serving 1,000
athletes of the Winter and Summer Olympics and countless others
who prepare to qualify and do not compete.86
Structural problems also exist on the NGB level. USAG, for example, was shown to lack reporting channels for gymnasts to raise
claims of abuse or other misconduct during Larry Nassar’s tenure.87
Nassar was a USAG and Michigan State University doctor who

80

See U.S. Olympic Committee Spent $27M on Athlete Stipends, $66M on Grants, ESPN
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/24538572/us-olympiccommittee-spent-27m-athlete-stipends-66m-grants [https://perma.cc/T93F-3VWW]; see
also USA WEIGHTLIFTING, THE USA WEIGHTLIFTING STIPEND SYSTEM: A METHOD TO
SUPPORT OUR ELITE &TRAINING EXPENSES 2018–2020 (Dec. 2017), https://
www.teamusa.org/-/media/USA_Weightlifting/Documents/2017-2020-SelectionProcedures/11_17_17/2018-Stipend_Update.pdf?la=en&hash=69DA4DAC4CACD4
038E7E2B57004B69CD4DCE34D1 [https://perma.cc/W5U2-V8UJ].
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sexually abused more than 150 women.88 Both internal and external
reporting channels in USAG were absent during the years Nassar
committed the abuse.89 Allegations of abuse finally surfaced in
2015, when American gymnast Maggie Nichols discussed her concerns about Nasser’s treatments.90 Nichols’ coach overheard her and
reported the alleged conduct to USAG officials.91 The USAG did
not notify law enforcement but instead hired a private investigator—
which resulted in the USAG concluding that there was no “reasonable suspicion” of any crime.92 “In late 2016, the USAG hired Indianapolis-based law firm, Krieg DeVault LLP, to conduct an independent review of [its] policies, procedures, and practices regarding
sexual misconduct . . . .”93 The law firm partnered with Praesidium,
an organization focusing on sexual abuse prevention in youth and
vulnerable adult organizations, to conduct the report.94 The resulting
report revealed that the USAG did not require its members to report
suspected child abuse and lacked any system to ensure that its various constituents and member clubs adhere to the organization’s
membership requirements.95 More stringent rules governing abuse
report processing may have resulted in an independent inquiry, a
police investigation, and a suspension of Nassar’s medical service
during the investigation process.96 The report recommended a “complete” cultural shift within the organization to prioritize the safety
and well-being of its athletes, as opposed to solely focusing on athletes’ success on the mat.97
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Long?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2018, 8:47 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/
jan/26/larry-nassar-abuse-gymnasts-scandal-culture [https://perma.cc/34YS-JS9N].
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C. Legal Background: Structure of the Olympics
In 1978, Congress passed the Amateur Sports Act, now known
as the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.98 This Act
appointed the USOPC as the coordinating body for all Olympic-related athletic activity in the United States, including athletic activity
related to international competition, such as the sports of the Olympic, Paralympic, Pan American, and Parapan American Games.99
The Act included provisions delineating how the NGBs, under the
aegis of the USOPC, can acquire certification and maintain that certification.100
Globally, the IOC is empowered to grant revenues to international sports federations and National Olympic Committees, among
others, to facilitate the development of the Olympic Movement.101
Other organizations include the World Anti-Doping Association and
the International Court for Arbitration of Sport, which were founded
by the IOC and are now semi-autonomous entities within the IOC
bureaucracy.102 The National Olympic Committees receive some
part of this revenue and distribute some of it either to their national
team athletes directly or, more often, to the NGBs for the Olympic
sports.103 The NGBs distribute a portion of revenue to their athletes.104 Through this system, no athlete is paid directly for their
98

See S. REP. NO. 105–325, at 1 (1998).
See History, TEAM USA, https://www.teamusa.org/about-the-usopc/history
[https://perma.cc/9TFM-LBEQ].
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PLAY THE GAME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2020/
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102 See History of the CAS, CT. OF ARB. FOR SPORT, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/generalinformation/history-of-the-cas.html [https://perma.cc/MY5N-LRBG]; see also Funding,
WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/funding [https://perma.cc/
3YL4-CGXZ].
103 See
Facts and Figures, CONG. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC CAUCUS,
https://olympicparalympiccaucus-langevin.house.gov/facts-and-figures
[https://perma.cc/BB6K-LZ5T].
104 See Robert Dineen, Olympic Movement Criticized for ‘Hiding’ Finances as Athletes
Struggle, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 23, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/olympics/
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labor as a performer in the Olympics, or any other Olympic-sanctioned event; however, some national team athletes receive training
stipends, awards, or other general performance-based support.105
This largely-decentralized power structure allows the IOC to operate on a global scale while retaining ultimate control over the direction of the Olympic Movement.106 The IOC exerts control over international sports federations and National Olympic Committees,
who in turn exert control over NGBs.107 The IOC “asserts that control inasmuch as it benefits the IOC, its image, and bank accounts.”108
Sexually abused athletes’ lawsuit against USAG and the USOPC
demonstrates how this decentralized structure helps the USOPC
avoid liability and refuse athlete-led calls for a better structural support system.109 Originally, sexual abuse survivors rejected a $215
million settlement offer made by the USAG on January 30, 2020, in
part because it included a release for the USOPC.110 The release
would have precluded all current and future claims against the Committee and would have absolved current and former officials within
the organization from offering testimony in the form of court depositions.111 This release offer was problematic considering that,

https://www.tampabay.com/news/health/2020/05/08/majority-of-us-olympic-sportsapplied-for-government-coronavirus-relief-money/ [https://perma.cc/Z2SU-M8SC].
105 See Dineen, supra note 104.
106
“The Olympic Movement” is how the International Olympic Committee describes
“the concerted, organi[z]ed, universal and permanent action, carried out under the supreme
authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of
Olympism.” Olympic Movement, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., https://www.olympic.org/theioc/leading-the-olympic-movement [https://perma.cc/S88G-QY2Q].
107
See National Olympic Committees, supra note 27; About the U.S. Olympic &
Paralympic Committee, TEAM USA, https://www.teamusa.org/about-the-usopc/structure
[https://perma.cc/3CQH-DC6J].
108 Gamalski, supra note 26, at 311.
109
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Lack of Settlement with Nassar Survivors, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2020, 5:38 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2020/10/09/usopc-sues-insurancecarriers-larry-nassar-settlement/5940262002/ [https://perma.cc/FG9B-MEXL].
110 Id.
111
John Barr & Dan Murphy, Court Documents: Simone Biles a Plaintiff in Abuse
Lawsuit, ABC NEWS (June 15, 2020, 11:19 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/courtdocuments-simone-biles-plaintiff-abuse-lawsuit/story?id=71257489
[https://perma.cc/FA5P-3RFY].
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according to the victims’ attorneys, Nassar continued his serial sexual assaults—victimizing more than 100 girls and young women—
after Olympic officials were warned of Nassar’s behavior.112 The
USOPC was suing its insurance carriers in a separate lawsuit, alleging that they failed to fulfill their contractual obligations to pay legal
and other costs and settle the lawsuits with the sexual assault victims
in a good faith manner.113 All parties have since reached settlement
agreements.114
The USOPC’s suspect role in the scandal and its protracted attempt to avoid legal responsibility demonstrates how the organization’s structure renders the Committee relatively unbeholden to athletes. Because the USAG relies on the USOPC for both funding and
its NGB certification, the USAG is incentivized to protect the
USOPC in its settlement negotiations.115 In fact, the USOPC began
a decertification proceeding against the USAG in light of the Nassar
scandal, but that proceeding was suspiciously halted after the
USAG’s Chapter Eleven proceeding.116 In this proceeding, the
USAG offered a settlement that would require gymnasts to release
the USOPC from liability related to the claims.117 In response, Attorney Michelle Simpson Tuegel, who represented more than two
dozen survivors of Nassar’s abuse, said:
112
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Zagger, USOC Moves to Pull USA Gymnastics’ Governing Body Status, LAW 360 (Nov. 5,
2018, 9:42 PM), https://www-law360-com.fls.idm.oclc.org/articles/1099211/usoc-movesto-pull-usa-gymnastics-governing-body-status (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
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360 (Jan. 30, 2020, 10:12 PM), https://www-law360-com.fls.idm.oclc.org/articles/
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USA Gymnastics and the USOC’s failure to . . . rectify the wrongs done . . . shows they have not really
turned over a new leaf . . . cultural problems in the
sport persist . . . survivors remain outside the circle
of decision making, and both the process and
timeframe for investigating allegations of abuse, remain . . . inadequate.118
Michael Phelps and other top competitors voiced similar sentiments.119 The USOPC offers access to sports psychologists, but athletes say the focus is on enhancing medal performance, not dealing
with afflictions like depression.120 When former skeleton World
Cup champion Katie Uhlaender was dealing with various health issues in 2018, partially resulting from a teammate’s suicide, the
USOPC directed her to a sports performance psychologist who told
her, “[y]ou seem to perform better from a dark place.”121 The
USOPC’s protocols direct athletes to sign medical waivers that grant
the Committee broad rights to share private health information with
their coaches, officials in charge of team selection, and nonmedical
staff.122
D. Areas of Law Theoretically Helpful to Athletes’ Predicament
1. Antitrust Law
One theoretical option for aggrieved athletes is bringing an antitrust claim against the USOPC. Antitrust laws are designed to “preserve a competitive marketplace and protect consumer economic
welfare.”123 “Competition is hurt when conduct harms the market’s
ability to present lower prices, better products, or more efficient
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119
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production methods to the consumer.”124 The key issue in the sports
context is whether the conduct at issue has predominantly anticompetitive effects—harming consumers—or whether the competitive
restraint benefits consumers more than unrestrained market competition.125 To fall within the main antitrust law, the Sherman Act,
challenged activity must be: (1) concerted (involving two or more
parties); (2) cause an unreasonable restraint; and (3) affect interstate
commerce.126 Theoretically, antitrust law applies to the USOPC and
its NGBs for activities such as sponsorship agreements.127 Such an
agreement (1) is concerted, because it is between the organization
and a sponsor; (2) causes an unreasonable restraint because athletes
are unable to make agreements with other parties; and (3) affects
interstate commerce due to these organizations’ business activities.
In analyzing Sherman Act claims, courts choose between various tests.128 Because the nature of sports business requires some
necessary restraints, the court usually uses a rule of reason analysis.129 This refers to a fact-specific analysis inquiring into whether
the challenged restraint has a substantially adverse competitive effect.130 Under this test, the plaintiff must prove the anticompetitive
effects of the challenged restraint.131 If the plaintiff’s showing is sufficient, the defendant then must prove the restraint achieves
124
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129
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procompetitive effects.132 If the defendant does so, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary
to achieve the claimed procompetitive effects, or that such effects
can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive way.133 If the plaintiff meets its burden, the jury balances the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine the net effect.134 If the net economic effect is negative, the challenged activity is deemed an unlawful and unreasonable restraint.135
As an example, Olympic athletes who want to challenge Rule 40
as an illegal restraint must establish the foregoing elements. Hence,
they would have to show actual adverse effects on consumers resulting from the Rule’s restraint on athletes’ full participation in independent sponsors’ advertisements. They might argue the Rule decreases the value of athlete sponsorships, which restricts sponsors’
abilities to advertise during the commercially valuable period of the
Olympic Games. The USOPC would likely respond that the restrictions on an athlete’s sponsors enhance product qualities promoted by the official sponsors.136 Alternatively, they may argue that
official sponsorship agreements provide USOPC athletes with more
financial support by increasing USOPC revenue.137 However, both
arguments are weak. It is highly questionable that official Olympic
sponsors somehow advertise superior products to the consumer over
individual athlete sponsors. Further, it is suspect, at best, that official
sponsors provide athletes with more financial support when USOPC
athletes receive merely seven to eight percent of USOPC revenue in
contrast to around fifty percent of league revenue that professional
athletes generally receive.138
2. Employment Law
A second possible solution is employment law. Employment law
governs the relationships between individual employees and

132
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employers.139 One significant legislation affecting employment law
is the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).140 The FLSA established
minimum wage, overtime pay, and recordkeeping standards affecting employees in the private sector.141 Covered workers are entitled
to $7.25 per hour minimum wage.142 Many states have minimum
wage laws where employees are entitled to the higher of the state or
federal minimum wage.143
To make out an FLSA claim, a plaintiff must show that an “employer” failed to pay an “employee” minimum wage and/or overtime pay.144 The test of employment is one of “economic reality,”
that accounts for the circumstances of the whole activity rather than
“isolated factors” being dispositive.145 Courts have considered factors such as the expectation of compensation, the power of the “employer” to fire and hire, and evidence that an arrangement was conceived or carried out to evade the law.146
3. Labor Law
A third path, labor law, has been well trodden by professional
athletes even if unionization bids have yet to affect the USOPC.147
Labor law largely concerns collective action and the rights of workers as a group.148 The most important and relevant labor law for
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See Labor and Employment Law: Career Path Introduction, CHI.-KENT COLL. OF L.,
https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/career-development/paths/labor-and-employment-law
[https://perma.cc/4W85-LMFV].
140
See Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa [https://perma.cc/JU8V-48KT].
141
Id.
142 Id.
143
Id.
144 See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2019).
145
Id. at 909.
146 Id.
147 Unions represent athletes in the NFL, NBA, NHL, and many other professional sports
leagues. Michael Macklon, How Labor Unions Changed Pro Sports, INVESTOPEDIA (June
25, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0711/the-rise-of-labor-unions-inpro-sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/27Q5-JZQT].
148 National Labor Relations Act: An Overview, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/national_labor_relations_act_nlra
[https://perma.cc/TX4A-ER4A].
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purposes of this Note is the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).149 The NLRA seeks to constrain strife among employers, employees, and labor organizations to encourage industry-wide
peace and economic production.150 The NLRA defined “labor organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan” which exists for the purpose of engaging with employers concerning “grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work.”151
A union is one example of a labor organization. The idea behind
a union is to use workers’ collective power to amass bargaining
power against an employer possessing financial power.152 Unions
argue this strategy achieves higher pay, better benefits, and stronger
voices on the job.153 Unions attempt to achieve such goals by negotiating collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”), or written legal
contracts between employers and a union on the topics of wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.154 The NLRA guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with
employers through representatives of their own choosing.155 It further establishes a procedure where employees can exercise their
choice to join a union in a secret-ballot election conducted by the
National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).156 The Board is an

149

Id.; see generally Major Laws Administered/Enforced, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/laws-and-regulations/laws
[https://perma.cc/27JXRWXT].
150 See 29 U.S.C. § 151. The NLRA was enacted on July 5, 1935. See NLRB,
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS 204, https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
basic-page/node-1717/organdfunctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/332A-3YKX].
151
29 U.S.C. § 152.
152 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Benjamin C. Ellis, The Relative Bargaining Power
of Employers and Unions in the Global Information Age: A Comparative Analysis of the
United States and Japan, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV 1, 3–4 (2010).
153 What Is a Union?, U
NION PLUS, https://www.unionplus.org/page/what-union
[https://perma.cc/22F7-MY7K].
154 What Is a Collective Bargaining Agreement?, SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/
resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/collectivebargainingagreement.aspx
(last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
155
See 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also id. § 159.
156 See id. § 159.
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independent federal agency created to enforce the NLRA.157 It is
composed of five members who are appointed by the President of
the United States, with the Senate’s approval, for five-year terms.158
In addition, the President, with the Senate’s approval, also appoints
the General Counsel, who supervises attorneys employed by the
Board as well as officers and employees of the Regional Offices, for
four-year terms.159 The Regional Director of each Regional Office
is appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the General
Counsel.160 Considering the Board’s jurisdiction over unionization
matters, including when an employer refuses to recognize a union,
Olympic athletes and hopefuls may consider unionizing during the
tenure of a sympathetic pro-labor Board. The timing is of particular
importance because the Board, in contrast to many other federal
agencies, is less committed to case precedent.161
Employers can always voluntarily recognize a labor organization as its workers’ representative if there is evidence that a majority
of the workers support it.162 If an employer does not recognize a labor organization, workers can apply for certification with the Board
and obligate an employer to bargain with them.163 To gain certification, the Board must recognize the workers as employees under the
NLRA.164 In determining an employer-employee relationship, the
Board often uses the common law employment test.165 This test
measures whether someone conducted: (1) performance of a service

157

See Frequently Asked Questions—NLRB, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/
faq/nlrb [https://perma.cc/MCU4-MB37].
158
NLRB, supra note 150.
159 Id. at 206. See also ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., COX AND BOK’S LABOR LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 73 (16th ed. 2016).
160 NLRB, supra note 150, at 205, 207–08.
161
See Robert Iafolla, Labor Board Repeatedly Topples Precedent Without Public Input,
BLOOMBERG L. (July 12, 2019, 6:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/labor-board-repeatedly-topples-precedent-without-public-input
[https://perma.cc/HJ87-A6UZ].
162 Your Right to Form a Union, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-weprotect/the-law/employees/your-right-to-form-a-union [https://perma.cc/5MHS-GBDA].
163 See id.
164
See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
165 Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 493.
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(2) under a contract of hire (3) subject to the other’s control or right
of control (4) in return for payment.166
The Board may also carry out a “joint employment” analysis because athletes may be jointly employed by the relevant NGB and the
USOPC.167 This “joint employment” test is the subject of changing
administrative law.168 The older test analyzed whether a common
law employment relationship existed, and then analyzed whether the
putative employer shared or codetermined matters that were essential terms and conditions of employment.169 “Direct and immediate”
control over workers was not necessary; reserved and indirect control, such as through contractual provisions, could be sufficient for
a joint employer-employee finding.170 The newest version of the test
is more employer-friendly. It specifically lists essential terms and
conditions and requires that at least one be shared or codetermined.171 Sharing or codetermining provisions requires that a putative employer actually exercised that right.172 Furthermore, the putative joint employer must have substantial direct and immediate
control over the terms and conditions.173 Finally, the putative employer’s sharing or codetermining of essential terms and conditions
must meaningfully affect matters relating to the employment relationship.174
The Board must also determine the appropriate bargaining unit.
In determining whether a group of employees should be allowed to

166

Id. at 493–94.
See GORMAN ET AL., supra note 159, at 291.
168
See Mark G. Kisicki, Long-Awaited NLRB Joint-Employer Rule Sets EmployerFriendly Standard for Joint-Employer Determinations, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Feb. 27,
2020),
https://ogletree.com/insights/long-awaited-nlrb-joint-employer-rule-setsemployer-friendly-standard-for-joint-employer-determinations/ [https://perma.cc/5S23337C].
169 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1600 (D.C. Cir. 2015), rev’d
on other grounds, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
170 Id.
171
See NLRB Issues Joint-Employer Final Rule, NLRB (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-issues-joint-employer-final-rule
[https://perma.cc/DT3N-8XCJ].
172 29 C.F.R. § 103.40 (2021).
173
Id.
174 Id.
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act as a bargaining unit, the Board uses a “community of interest”
analysis.175 This community is composed of workers who have the
same or substantially similar interests concerning wages, hours, and
working conditions.176
II. CURRENT LAW OFFERS INADEQUATE RECOURSE FOR ATHLETES
The first two areas of law discussed above, antitrust law and employment law, unfortunately fail to assist National Team Members
in their quest to improve Olympic revenue distribution and create
optimal structural support systems. For example, an antitrust claim
against the USOPC to contest the restrictions placed on athletes’
sponsor advertisements or to challenge the lack of compensation
would likely fail. While these actions can theoretically constitute illegal “unreasonable restraints” under antitrust law, the USOPC enjoys an antitrust exemption, at least in the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.177 Employment law, while more promising than antitrust law, is also problematic because NCAA athletes, who are in
many ways similar to National Team Members, have been ruled to
be non-employees of the NCAA. After discussing these two areas
of law, this Note will analyze labor law to show how it can empower
athletes to improve revenue distribution and the existing structural
support system.
A. Inadequacy of Antitrust Law as Applied to the USOPC and Its
NGBs
Despite the availability of antitrust law for athletes challenging
restrictions, courts are likely to dismiss such claims due to a longrecognized antitrust exemption to the Ted Stevens Act.178 At

175

See NLRB v. Catherine McAuley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 344–45 (6th Cir. 1989).
See NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1997),
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3024/basicguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YC7J-UB8K].
177 See Bruce D. Sokler, Ninth Circuit Finds Implied Antitrust Immunity for USATF and
USOC in Advertising Restriction Case, MINTZ (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.mintz.com/
insights-center/viewpoints/2018-08-ninth-circuit-finds-implied-antitrust-immunity-usatfand-usoc [https://perma.cc/H46X-BUHA]; see infra Part I.A.
178 The Ted Stevens Act established the USOC. See Sokler, supra note 177.
176
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present, three appellate courts have found such an exemption.179 In
Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, a chewing gum company
alleged the USOC and USA Track & Field (“USATF”) restricted it
from sponsoring athletes during the Olympic trials through an illegal
anticompetitive conspiracy in violation of antitrust law.180 Gold
Medal LLC (d/b/a/ “Run Gum”) argued that such limitations, imposed by the USOC and enforced by the USATF, excluded scores
of individual sponsors from the marketplace—where the USOC had
monopoly power—in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.181
The Ninth Circuit recognized that implied antitrust immunity is generally unfavorable and can only be justified by a convincing showing of “clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system.”182 But the court held that in light of the considerable
authority bestowed upon NGBs to fund the “Olympic Mission,” applying antitrust law to enjoin advertising and logo restrictions on
advertisers would “unduly interfere” with the mission of protecting
the value of corporate sponsorships and maximizing sanctioned
fundraising.183 As long as NGBs create rules integral to the organizations’ Olympic mission, they are free from antitrust law’s
reach.184
The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the USOC and NGBs have an
implied antitrust exemption in Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Association.185 There, basketball player Ronald Behagen challenged a
rule that prohibited a player from being reinstated as an amateur
more than once after playing professionally.186 The Tenth Circuit
ruled that under Congress’s clear intent, the Association’s decision
to deny reinstatement due to amateur status was necessary and therefore exempt from federal antitrust law.187 The clear intent of Congress manifests in the Ted Stevens Act, which authorizes an NGB

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

See id.
Gold Medal LLC v. USA Track & Field, 899 F.3d 712, 713 (9th Cir. 2018).
See Sokler, supra note 177; Gold Medal LLC, 899 F.3d at 713–14.
See Gold Medal LLC, 899 F.3d at 715.
See id.
See Sokler, supra note 177.
See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 884 F.2d 524, 530 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 530.
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to designate individuals and teams to represent the United States and
certify the amateur eligibility of those individuals and teams.188
In JES Properties., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit found immunity for the United States Equestrian Federation
(“USEF”) when the plaintiff equestrian event promoter was unable
to secure a date for equestrian competitions in Florida due to the
USEF’s Mileage Rule.189 The Rule barred any recognized A-rated
competition from competing within 250 miles of another recognized
A-rated competition on the same date.190 The court ruled that the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
USEF because the USEF and equestrian event promoters were immune from antitrust liability due to implications of the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.191 Antitrust law is therefore unfavorable to athletes seeking to challenge sponsorship restrictions
and other restraints on trade established by the USOPC.
B. Inadequacy of the FLSA as Applied to Athletes Similarly
Situated to U.S. Olympic Athletes
Even though no National Team Member has made an FLSA
claim against the USOPC, there is some dissuading case precedent
in similarly situated NCAA athlete claims. NCAA athletes have
brought multiple unsuccessful FLSA claims against the NCAA in
attempts to receive compensation for their integral role in the multibillion-dollar college sports industry.192 In Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association/Pac-12 Conference, the Ninth Circuit
held that neither the NCAA nor the Pac-12 Conference were the athletes’ employers and, thus, were not required to compensate them.193
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Id. at 528.
See JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d 1224, 1227–28 (11th Cir.
2006).
190
Id. at 1226–27.
191 Id. at 1228.
192 See Eben Novy-Williams, College Sports, B
LOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
quicktake/college-sports-ncaa [https://perma.cc/XF3S-75LZ] (Sept. 27, 2017, 11:11 AM).
193 See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2019);
Lisa Nagele-Piazza, College Football Player Isn’t NCAA Employee, SHRM (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/
pages/college-football-player-is-not-ncaa-employee.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Y6DK97GY].
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The court applied the “economic realities” test which, among many
other factors, considers the plaintiff’s expectation of compensation,
the alleged employer’s power to hire and fire, and evidence that an
arrangement was conceived of or carried out to evade the law.194
The court found that NCAA regulations limiting scholarships did
not create any expectation of compensation.195 Further, the court
emphasized that the athletes did not adequately show the NCAA or
Pac-12 had the power to hire or fire them, nor that NCAA rules were
an attempt to evade the law.196 Finally, the court ruled the revenue
generated by the NCAA did not by itself create an employment relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA.197 In a Seventh
Circuit case, Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the
court reached a similar conclusion.198
There is some optimism, however, that the Third Circuit will
rule differently for NCAA athletes. Trey Johnson, a former Villanova defensive back football player, is currently suing the NCAA
and many of its member schools in an ongoing case.199 The lawsuit
is in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and alleges minimumwage law violations.200 Johnson has survived summary judgment,
allowing him to proceed with his minimum-wage claim.201 His lawsuit is promising because it relies heavily on a 2018 case, also in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, whose underlying analysis questions the applicability of the economic realities test that defeated the
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See Dawson, 932 F.3d at 909; see also Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (July 2008),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/13-flsa-employment-relationship
[perma.cc/NAU7-HJQL].
195 See Dawson, 932 F.3d at 909.
196
See id. at 910.
197 See id.
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See generally Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016);
Christian Dennie, Berger v. NCAA: Student-Athletes Are Not Employees Under the FLSA,
BG&S (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:14 PM), https://bgsfirm.com/berger-v-ncaa-student-athletes-arenot-employees-under-the-flsa/ [https://perma.cc/GJ4S-EJ9J].
199 See Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. Is Sued for Not Paying Athletes as Employees, N.Y. T
IMES
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/sports/ncaa-lawsuit.html [https://
perma.cc/2LSR-SHVH].
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See id.
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claims in Berger and Dawson.202 Livers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was dismissed for exceeding the statute of limitations, but the court determined that a more holistic application of the
economic realities test was more appropriate.203 The court also refrained from denying the possibility that a different multi-factor test
could be identified for evaluating whether a student athlete who receives a scholarship is “an employee” for FLSA purposes.204
Taking these cases into account, it appears that employment law
is, at best, a problematic avenue for National Team Members seeking to gain minimum wage and other employment law protections.
Even though no Olympic athletes have tried to sue for greater compensation, Dawson demonstrates how current case law would be unfriendly to such an endeavor. The court concluded that NCAA regulations providing a limitation on scholarships did not create an expectation of compensation because Dawson’s school, rather than the
NCAA, provided it.205 The court also concluded that Dawson could
not demonstrate the NCAA or Pac-12 had the power to fire or hire
him, because the record did not show they choose the players on any
Division 1 football team.206 Further, Dawson provided no evidence
that NCAA rules were conceived to evade the law.207 The court also
rejected Dawson’s argument that revenue generated by college
sports converted the relationship between student athletes and the
NCAA into an employment relationship.208 As such, the NCAA and
Pac-12 were regulatory bodies, not employers of student athletes under the FLSA.209
Applying the Dawson court’s analysis to National Team Members, a similar case seeking compensation from the USOPC, though
possible, is unlikely to prevail. While the Division 1 college football
players failed to establish an “expectation of compensation,”210 the
202

See Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 17-4271, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83655, at *45–46 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2018).
203 Id. at *49–50.
204 Id.
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USOPC arguably does provide compensation. National Team Members receive Direct Athlete Support from the USOPC and receive
other stipends and awards from their NGBs. 211 Thus, a court may
find the “expectation of compensation” factor in the economic reality test fulfilled.
The “power to fire or hire” factor would be more contested. The
USOPC certainly possesses a right to “hire, fire, and discipline,”212—or more specifically, to select, deselect, and discipline
the athletes who generate its revenue. The USOPC by-laws clearly
express this policy: the USOPC requires the NGBs to establish athlete selection procedures “approved by a Designated Committee . . .
and by the corporation”213 for the Olympic, Paralympic, or Pan
American Games and “timely recommend” to the corporation athletes for the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Games.214
This language illustrates the USOPC’s ultimate control over athlete
selection and deselection for the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan
American Games. However, the USOPC rarely uses this power because it leaves selection criteria to the NGBs or selects athletes
based on well-defined criteria.215
Under the last prong, plaintiffs would have difficulty proving
that the USOPC created its compensation rules to evade the FLSA.
The USOPC was chartered by the Ted Stevens Act and its rules appear to comply with it, rather than an attempt to somehow evade
employment law.216 Additionally, if plaintiffs try to use the same
revenue-related factor in their argument, they will likely fail. According to the Ninth Circuit, “precedent demonstrates that revenue
does not automatically engender or foreclose the existence of an employment relationship under the FLSA.”217 In sum, this case demonstrates that employment law is a problematic path for National Team
211

See Athlete Support Programs, USA ARCHERY, https://www.usarchery.org/highperformance/athlete-support-programs [https://perma.cc/3J67-X2RG].
212 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1605 (2015).
213 U.S. O
LYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., BYLAWS § 8 (2020) [hereinafter U.S. OLYMPIC
& PARALYMPIC BYLAWS]; see also 36 U.S.C. § 220501.
214 Id.
215
See Team Selection, TEAM USA, https://www.teamusa.org/team-usa-athlete-services/
team-selection [https://perma.cc/J75U-PRHX].
216
See generally 36 U.S.C. § 220502.
217 Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Members attempting to achieve greater compensation from the
USOPC and their NGBs. Nonetheless, the Johnson case is promising and may result in case precedent that Olympic athletes can utilize to make an employment law claim.218
III. UNIONIZATION
A third area of law provides a friendlier path than antitrust law
and employment law for resolving the problems that Olympic athletes face. Labor law would not only allow National Team Members
to exert the type of pressure necessary to bargain for fairer revenue
distribution but, unlike employment law, would provide the ability
to bargain for a more adequate structural support system.219 Labor
law contains the necessary mechanisms to help resolve these issues
due to the protections it grants to workers advocating for better
wages, hours, and working conditions.220 Compensation and structural support fall under the categories of wages and working conditions.
Instead of settling for insufficient training stipends and
“awards,” National Team Members, if deemed to be employees under the NLRA, should bargain for an actual salary. This salary would
compensate them for the effort and time spent in preparing for a
quadrennial event that the IOC uses to generate billions of dollars.221
This salary would ideally reflect USOPC and IOC revenues. National Team Members are athletes that earn their way onto their respective sport’s National Team. As such, they are in the best
218

See generally Johnson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 19-5230, 2021 WL
3771810 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2021), motion to certify appeal granted, No. CV 19-5230, 2021
WL 6125095 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2021).
219
See Rachel Bachman, Olympic Athletes Ask: Should We Start a Union?, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 26, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/olympic-athletes-ask-shouldwe-start-a-union-11551193784 [https://perma.cc/JXA5-2VMH].
220 See Poster of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, U.S. DEP’T
LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/olms/regs/compliance/eo_posters/
OF
employeerightsposter11x17_2019final.pdf [https://perma.cc/USQ2-MCMX].
221 From 2005 to 2008, the IOC generated nearly $6 billion of revenue. Gus Lubin,
Olympics, Inc: Inside the Secretive, $6 Billion World of The International Olympic
Committee, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2010, 11:51 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
olympics-inc-inside-the-business-of-the-ioc [https://perma.cc/YT6B-NZHR]. In 2016, the
IOC made $3.56 billion. Baccellieri, supra note 24.
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position to qualify for the Olympics among lower-ranked competitors and are undoubtedly a necessary ingredient for Olympic revenue. Without their hard work, there would not be sufficiently trained
athletes to compete at the quadrennial Games. In American sports
leagues, management and athletes typically share in revenue almost
equally.222 In 2012, the USOPC allocated only six percent of its
spending to athletes as cash payments.223 Athletes should bargain
for an exponential increase in that number.
Regarding the structural support system, athletes should demand
that the USOPC make greater investments into mental health and
wellness professionals. There must be contractual protections preventing such professionals from sharing confidential information
with USOPC management and coaches. By facilitating these protections, athletes will be more comfortable receiving the help they
need.
Athletes may also demand that some types of claims against
USOPC officials and staff, such as physical or sexual abuse, trigger
mandatory internal investigations—with certain findings resulting
in a mandatory external investigation.224 A set-up such as this would
have likely prevented or minimized Larry Nassar’s abuse. Professors Marc Edelman, of the Zicklin School of Business of Baruch
College, and Jennifer Pacella, of the Kelley School of Business of
Indiana University, suggest a robust whistleblower protection program.225 This protection program should have specific measures in
place to prevent retaliatory conduct that alters team selection and
funding. Gymnasts, like other NGB athletes, fear reprisal despite
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See Cheri Bradish et al., Olympic Commercialization and Player Compensation: A
Review of Olympic Financial Reports, TED ROGERS SCH. OF MGMT. (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://mcusercontent.com/84af2d82b4ff06bd42452dbf8/files/39f1fd06-9ec8-4ca3-85b1a9d392aefaad/2020.04.22_Olympic_Commercialization_and_Player_Compensation_FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV33-GTQX].
223 Will Hobson, Olympic Executives Cash in On a ‘Movement’ That Keeps Athletes
Poor, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/
olympic-executives-cash-in-on-a-movement-that-keeps-athletespoor/2016/07/30/ed18c206-5346-11e6-88eb-7dda4e2f2aec_story.html
[https://perma.cc/EPS8-VWQ6].
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USAG’s whistleblowing policy in place since 2014.226 It is important that this system be one bargained for and structured by athletes. Without pressure coming directly from athletes, those in
charge are less inclined to enforce regulations that serve no interest
to them. For example, the corporation Enron had a code of conduct,
compliance program, and a set of core values promoting ethical behavior in the years leading up to its bankruptcy.227 However, these
policies failed due “in large part,” to their non-enforcement, lack of
directorial oversight, and various unaddressed conflicts of interest
within the corporation.228 Likewise, the USOPC and its NGBs will
not implement important reforms without pressure.
Below, this Note will argue that National Team Members of
many Olympic sports are employees under the NLRA because they
fulfill the four requirements of the common law definition of employment, which the Board often uses in its analysis.229
The counterargument—that the NGB is the athletes’ employer
rather than the USOPC—may succeed. However, even if the appropriate NGB is ruled to be the employer, the USOPC would still
likely constitute an employer under the Board’s joint employment
analysis.
In this scenario, if the Board uses the recent, more employerfriendly test in its analysis,230 fewer National Team Members will
be deemed employees. This is because the new test requires substantial direct and immediate control over terms and conditions of employment.231 Further, many National Team Members will be excluded due to the independent contractor exemption, which involves
consideration of the worker’s “entrepreneurial opportunity.”232 But
undoubtedly, the National Team Members of many Olympic sports
would be deemed employees under the NLRA and thus allowed to
unionize.
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A. The Board Will Only Allow a Bargaining Unit of Olympic
Athletes and Hopefuls (National Team Members) to Unionize If
They Are “Employees” of the USOPC Under the NLRA
To gain the right to unionize, at least in the scenario where the
USOPC refuses to voluntarily recognize the athletes’ chosen collective bargaining representative, the Board must ultimately interpret
them to be employees of the USOPC.233 In order to be employees
under the Board’s definition, athletes must be statutory employees
under Section 2(3) of the NLRA.234 The Section states, “[t]he term
‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer . . . but shall not include . . .
any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”235
Most of the relevant language is the circular assertion that “employee” shall include “any employee.”236 To analyze who fits the
definition, the Board looks at the language protecting the “exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing[,]” as well as
the broad statutory definitions of “employer” and “employee.”237 In
answering this question, the Board applies a single federal law: the
federal common law.238
To begin, the Board often analyzes each situation under the common law test of employment.239 There are four requirements of the
common law definition of employee—and National Team Members
satisfy each one.240 This includes: (1) engagement in an activity
from which a reasonable person would generally expect compensation, (2) under a “contract for hire,” (3) ceding a “right of control,”
(4) in return for “payment.”

233

See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1089 (2016); see also Edelman &
Pacella, supra note 32, at 493.
234 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490, n.27 (2004) (citation omitted); see also
Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 494.
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See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152.
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1. First Requirement of “Employee”: Engagement in Activity
Generating an Objective Expectation of Compensation
The first requirement is engagement in an activity for which a
reasonable person, absent any coercion, would generally expect
compensation.241 This objective test historically excludes scenarios
where individuals perform work in the context of an educational
program such as job training.242 Regarding the expectation of “compensation,” in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Department of
Labor, the Supreme Court held that even individuals considering
themselves “volunteers” might constitute employees, legally speaking, if they could reasonably expect payment in exchange for services rendered.243
This first requirement asks whether “a reasonable person…would generally expect compensation” for engaging in this activity.244 The tremendous number of hours during which National
Team Members strive to qualify for and compete in the Games—
including the practice and training, competitions, and the Olympics
themselves—all while partially or wholly sacrificing their non-athletic careers, demonstrates activity for which a reasonable person
would expect compensation. This conclusion is particularly strong
considering that the athletes’ engagement in this “activity” generates
hundreds of millions in revenue for the USOPC and their NGBs.245
Principles of intellectual property law also support the contention that a “reasonable person, absent any coercion, would generally
expect compensation” in such situations.246 Intellectual property is
based on the principle that if you create something, it is yours to
exploit.247 More specifically, the Lockean property theory recognizes intellectual property rights as fundamentally similar to
241
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Id. at 496.
244 See Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 494.
245 See Larry Eder, How Well Are US Athletes Supported by the USOC? And 11 Other
Olympic Questions, Written by Nathan Ikon Crumpton, for the USAthleticTrust.org,
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property rights in physical assets.248 Intellectual goods are a result
of a person’s “value-creating, productive labor,” and, as such, Locke
expressly recognized copyright as property.249 An athlete, as a creator of a copyrightable performance, theoretically can be argued to
“own” his or her performance rights in events that generate revenue.
Therefore, a reasonable person in the athletes’ position would expect
compensation for working to create intellectual property.
2. Second Requirement of “Employee”: Contract for Hire
The second requirement of the common law employee test is the
existence of a “contract for hire.”250 Case precedent indicates this
contract can be implied-in-law, even absent any actual agreement,
so long as general principles of fairness and equity would support
such a result.251 In any case, there are numerous explicit contracts
that tie athletes to the USOPC.252 For example, Olympians sign contracts agreeing to participate in the Olympics.253 These agreements
include promises to maintain eligibility, dress and behave a certain
way, abide by the rules and regulations of the OSOPC, and grant the
USOPC the right to profit from their name, image, and likeness in
events that generate millions in revenue.254 In return, athletes receive publicity and the opportunity to be medal winners and receive
bonuses.255 Olympic hopefuls also sign contracts to gain funding
from their NGB—funding the NGB itself receives from the
248

Adam Mossoff, Why Intellectual Property Rights? A Lockean Justification, L. &
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250 See Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 497.
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CURLING
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https://www.teamusa.org/-/media/USA_Curling/Documents/
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USOPC—as well as contracts to receive funding directly from the
USOPC in exchange for their efforts.256
3. Third Requirement of “Employee”: Right of Control
The third common law requirement to qualify as an employee is
the “right of control.”257 This involves the employer limiting freedoms of alleged employees in a significant manner.258 For example,
Region 13 of the Board recently held that Northwestern University
exercised the requisite “control” over its grant-in-aid football players when they engaged in forty to fifty hours per week of footballrelated activities during their fall semester.259 In that unionization
effort, the Regional Director solely used the common law employee
definition in his analysis.260 He determined that players who receive
scholarships were under “strict and exacting” control by their employer throughout the entire year.261 He also considered that the
coaches monitored the players to enforce adherence to NCAA and
team rules and disciplined them for infractions.262
There is a similar right of control in the athlete-USOPC relationship.263 The USOPC sometimes exercises the right of control directly, as evidenced by direct reference to that right in NGB contracts, as well as indirectly through the NGB itself.264 An example
of direct rights can be found in the 2018–2019 United States Curling
Association National Team Agreement, where athletes pledged to
not commit any anti-doping violation as defined by the IOC, the
World Curling Federation, the World Anti-Doping Agency, the
United States Anti-Doping Agency, and the USOC.265 This
256

See US Curling Agreement, supra note 252.
Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 498; see also Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B.
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LYMPIC COMM., U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE POLICY NGB ATHLETE
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requirement is a significant limitation on athlete freedom because
the anti-doping rules are quite expansive and do not involve a small
number of chemical agents, but rather an assortment of compounds
that often function as ingredients in over-the-counter and prescription medications.266 In the sections governing compensation, and
time and training expenses, the agreement includes a covenant that
the athlete will comply with “the terms and conditions set forth in
[the] Agreement and established by the USOC.”267 USOPC direct
rights of control are also evident in non-Olympic years. The USOPC
contracts with National Team Members to provide funding in exchange for promises to follow USOC by-laws, terms, and conditions
restricting their behavior and the promise to compete in the Games
if they qualify.268 Although control over practice schedule, diet, and
other variables differ by sport, all National Team Members can be
suspended or have their funding cut for violations of NGB and
USOPC rules.269
One may argue that NGBs are independent employers of National Team Members and that the USOPC lacks the requisite right
of control. However, indirect “right of control” can be established
through a creative analysis of NGBs as agents of the USOPC. An
NGB’s viability as an amateur athletic organization depends wholly
on the USOPC because young athletes are lured to these sports, partially or mostly due to their Olympic appeal.270 Without NGB certification, an amateur sports organization would hemorrhage members quickly. If an NGB like the USAG did not allow gymnasts to
qualify for the Olympics, young athletes would flock to whichever
amateur gymnastics organization the USOPC subsequently designated the “national governing body.” The USOPC by-laws (the “Bylaws”), effective January 1, 2020, demonstrate the committee’s
power over these organizations. Section 8.1 states: “ . . . the Board
266

See How Athletes Can Safely Use Cold and Flu Products, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
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has the power to certify qualified organizations as NGBs” and grants
the Board power to review all matters relating to an NGB’s continued certification.271 Only one NGB is recognized in each sport and
that organization must be a member of an international sporting federation recognized by the IOC.272 Any organization that becomes an
NGB “must cooperate with and satisfy all aspects of the corporation’s NGB Certification program. Any entity not so certified, and
any entity decertified by the corporation will automatically be ineligible for membership.”273 The USOPC exerts extensive and thorough control through certification. An NGB must fulfill all responsibilities as an NGB as established by the By-laws; adopt and maintain governance policies complying with the By-laws’ requirements;
satisfy such other requirements set forth by the corporation; establish clear athlete, team, and team official selection procedures approved by the corporation; and recommend to the corporation athletes, teams, and team officials for the Olympic, Paralympic, and
Pan American Games teams.274 The By-laws require athlete representatives to make up at least twenty percent of positions on the
NGB’s Board of Directors, executive board, and other governing
boards.275 These athlete representatives must themselves fulfill very
specific criteria, such as having competed in the Olympic or Pan
American Games.276 Altogether Section 8 of the By-laws contains
no less than ten pages of specific control that is exerted by the
USOPC over NGBs.277 That control is further enforced in Section
10, which outlines the process for NGB members to file a complaint
against the NGB with the USOPC based on NGB noncompliance
with Section 8.278
Ultimately, the Ted Stevens Act establishes the relationship between the USOPC and the amateur sports organizations that are
NGB-certified.279 The Ted Stevens Act gives the USOPC the power
271
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to recognize amateur sports organizations as national governing
bodies.280 It also grants a review of that recognition and power to
take whatever action the USOPC considers appropriate, including
placing conditions on continued recognition.281 All NGBs have extremely thorough duties.282
Therefore, any right of control granted to NGBs by National
Team Members is, by extension, a right of control possessed by the
USOPC. When considering the “right of control” requirement, at the
very least, courts should interpret NGB rights of control as jointlyheld by the USOPC. Ultimately, a court may decide that the NGB
and the USOPC are joint employers of the National Team Members
and that a bargaining representative should negotiate with both entities. Regardless of whether courts will come to view the NGBs as
agents of the USOPC or will regard both as joint employers, it is
clear that many NGBs exert great control over their National Team
Members. Professor Edelman and Professor Pacella call the time
commitments that the USAG places on elite gymnasts and the great
limitations on their general freedom “a strong case in favor of finding the exercise of control by a purported employer.”283 The USAG
requires its competitive gymnasts to train “seven hours per day, six
days a week”—a similar time commitment to that required of the
Northwestern University grant-in-aid college football players who
Region 13 found to be “employees.”284 In addition, elite female
gymnasts competing for the USAG are required to surrender decision-making power over their nutrition, medical treatment, and access to doctors.285 Even worse, the USAG’s intensive regiment has
encouraged and even forced young gymnasts to “go to bed hungry.”286 Ultimately, all or at least some of that control is exerted by
the USOPC, either directly through oversight and discipline, or indirectly through each NGB’s athletic training, coaching, and facilities. The USAG, however, is only one NGB. Other NGBs may have

280
281
282
283
284
285
286

See id. § 220521(a)(1).
See id. § 220521(d).
See id. § 220524.
See Edelman & Pacella, supra note 32, at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2022]

OLYMPIANS AS LABORERS

731

less control over their athletes. This third requirement would be
highly influential because, depending on the nature of control in
each NGB, some National Team Members may be deemed employees under the NLRA, while others may not.
4. Fourth Requirement of “Employee”: Work for Payment
The fourth requirement of the common law definition of “employee” is to work “in return for payment.”287 As a matter of law,
payment need not be monetary in nature.288 For example, in Northwestern University, Region 13 of the Board held that the players
constituted employees and, as such, implicitly received payment
from their college in the form of academic scholarships.289 The
Northwestern University case specifically involved football players
who depended on their scholarships to pay for “basic necessities,
including food and shelter,” because NCAA regulations made it difficult for them to otherwise profit from their athletic abilities.290 The
scholarships were “tied to the player’s performance of athletic services as evidenced by the fact that scholarships can be immediately
canceled if the player voluntarily with-[drew] from the team or
abus[ed] team rules.”291
Regarding National Team Members, it is well known that both
the NGBs and the USOPC give athletes training stipends and
awards.292 The opportunity to receive funds, awards, and endorsement deals would all count as “payment.”293 In great part, funds and
awards are allocated by the USOPC in a symbiotic-type relationship.294 For example Appendix C of the United States Curling
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Association National Team Agreement explains that funding in the
form of value-in-kind allocation is received from the USOC on a
specific date.295 After review of athlete submissions, this funding is
later disbursed to the athletes.296 The Committee can revoke these
funds based on violations related to conduct and performance.297
The “work” portion of the fourth requirement is therefore fulfilled.
Ultimately, if the Board, a Regional Office, or a court applies
the common law definition of employee, U.S. National Team Members of many NGBs would likely be categorized as employees of the
USOPC.
B. Joint Employment Analysis
Because both NGBs and the USOPC theoretically employ athletes, the Board may undertake a “joint employment” analysis to determine whether the employer designation is valid.298 This analysis
would only apply if the Board were to determine that the NGB is the
primary employer of the athletes. The applicable joint employment
test perfectly demonstrates the politicization of the Board; the new
post-election Board established its current incarnation in 2020.299 To
accommodate the changing nature of this test, which can be modified by incoming Board members, it is important to discuss both the
pre-2020 test and the post-2020 test.300 Indeed, a future pro-labor
Board may return to the old standard.301
1. The Pre-2020 Test
The Board established the pre-2020 test in the 2015 case,
Browning Ferris Industries of California, Inc v. National Labor Relations Board.302 Browning Ferris concerned a recycling plant,
Browning Ferris Industries (“BFI”), that employed sixty unionized
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workers.303 BFI contracted with Leadpoint, which supplied about
240 full- and part-time workers to sort materials, perform housekeeping duties, clean screens, and so on.304 In its analysis, the Board
began by emphasizing the broad nature of the NLRA, which provides that the term “employee” is not to be limited to employees of
a particular employer, unless the NLRA explicitly states otherwise.305 The Board also emphasized the NLRA’s ultimate purpose:
to encourage collective bargaining.306 It noted, “[t]o best promote
this policy, [the] joint-employer standard—to the extent permitted
by the common law—should encompass the full range of employment relationships wherein meaningful collective bargaining is, in
fact, possible.”307
The Board then overruled prior precedent and articulated a new
two-factor test.308 This test analyzed whether a common law relationship existed and, if so, whether the putative joint employer
shared or codetermined matters that were essential terms and conditions of employment.309 Diverging from prior precedent, the Board
would no longer require “direct and immediate” control over workers to establish a joint-employer relationship.310 Instead it would
consider both reserved and indirect control, such as through contractual provisions, as potentially sufficient evidence to establish a jointemployer relationship, regardless of whether the right to control is
ever exercised.311 However, to be a joint employer under Browning
Ferris, there must have been at least a common law employment
relationship between the parties, as well as shared or codetermined
matters that are essential terms and conditions of employment, so as
to facilitate meaningful bargaining.312 After all, a Board order that
an employer bargain with a union over the employment’s terms and
conditions would be ineffective if another party not subject to the
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
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order exercised the final say over a working condition or could
simply override a choice negotiated in a collective-bargaining agreement.313
The Board found BFI a joint employer by relying on three matters, codetermined by BFI, that were “essential terms and conditions
of employment.”314 One was hiring, firing, and discipline.315 By virtue of the two parties’ agreement, BFI retained the right to require
Leadpoint to “meet or exceed [BFI’s] own standard selection procedures and tests,” requiring all applicants pass drug tests and proscribing the hiring of workers deemed by BFI ineligible for rehire.316
BFI did not participate in Leadpoint’s day-to-day hiring process,
however, it was irrelevant because BFI codetermined the process’s
outcome by imposing specific conditions on Leadpoint’s ability to
make hiring decisions.317 BFI also possessed the same unqualified
right to fire.318 Again the Board did not put much value in the actual
use of that right (which occurred only twice), but instead emphasized that the outcome of those disciplinary proceedings, resulting
in two employees being fired, “was preordained by BFI’s ultimate
right under the terms of the [a]greement to dictate who works at its
facility.”319 The second matter the Board looked at was supervision,
direction of work, and hours.320 The Board found “particular importance” in BFI’s unilateral control over the speed of the streams
and specific sorting productivity standards.321 Finally, the Board analyzed the matter of wages.322 It found that BFI played a significant
role in determining wages.323 Specifically, BFI prevented Leadpoint
from paying employees more than that which it paid BFI employees
performing comparable work.324 The court found these three matters
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were adequately “shared and codetermined” such that it designated
both Leadpoint and BFI as joint employers obligated to collectively
bargain with the employees’ labor representative.325
The USOPC, as demonstrated, is likely a common law employer
of many NGB National Team athletes. However, if the Board determines that the NGB is the appropriate employer, the Board may undertake a joint employment analysis of the USOPC. The question
would be whether the USOPC codetermines the “essential terms and
conditions of employment.”326 The USOPC certainly possesses a
right to “hire, fire, and discipline,”327 or more specifically, select,
deselect, and sanction the athletes who generate its revenue.328 The
USOPC By-laws clearly express this policy; the USOPC requires
the NGBs to establish clear athlete, team, and team official selection
procedures approved by the corporation329 and recommend athletes,
teams, and team officials for the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan
American Games teams.330 This language illustrates the USOPC’s
ultimate control over athlete selection and deselection for the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Games.
The ultimate source of the corporation’s powers is the Ted Stevens Act.331 The Ted Stevens Act delineated the USOPC’s powers
as pertaining to amateur athletics and the Olympic Games.332 There
are six powers in number, but the most relevant powers regarding
the right to “hire, fire, and discipline,” are the third, fifth, and sixth
powers.333 The third enumerated power is to “organize, finance, and
control the representation of the United States in the competitions
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and events of the Olympic Games . . . and obtain, directly or by delegation to the appropriate national governing body, amateur representation.”334 By controlling the representation, the USOPC has ultimate authority over team selection (i.e., hiring, firing, and disciplining). Even if the USOPC often delegates these tasks to the
NGBs, the USOPC at least shares or codetermines them. The fifth
power is to “facilitate . . . the resolution of conflicts or disputes that
involve any of its members and any amateur athlete . . . that arise in
connection with their eligibility for and participation in the Olympic
Games.”335 Since many conflicts or disputes surround an athlete’s
selection, deselection, and discipline, this power is indicative of the
USOPC’s ultimate authority over these issues.
In addition, disciplinary language is found in NGB national team
agreements.336 For example, in the USA Climbing Athlete 2021
Agreement, the U.S. Olympic Committee, together with USA
Climbing’s CEO and the High Performance Staff, reserve the right
to discipline the athlete if he or she fails to comply with contractual
provisions.337 Disciplinary action, which is explicitly non-progressive, includes a verbal and written warning, repayment of all costs
associated with a competition, suspension from the team or competition, dismissal from the team trip or training camp with the responsibility of covering travel costs, stipend reduction or forfeiture, and
elimination from future USA Climbing events.338 The USOPC also
exerts control over the selection process by providing “financial assistance to any organization or association . . . in furtherance of the
purposes of the corporation.”339 By providing or not providing its
financial assistance to NGBs, the USOPC exerts control over the
selection process. More funding can mean more incentives for
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competitors to vie for placement, and reduced funding can mean
fewer incentives.340
Supervision is another matter essential to the terms and conditions of employment. The USOPC supervises and directs the training of the athletes, both indirectly through the NGBs and directly at
training camps, training centers, and in competitions.341 This supervision is sometimes carried out virtually, such as through the USOC
Elite Athlete Monitoring System.342 If an athlete is injured, the
USOPC may require them to undergo a thorough examination by a
USOC doctor and the injured athlete must comply with the full rehabilitation process as prescribed by the NGB or the USOC.343 The
statutory grant for supervision and “direction of work,” is found in
Section 220505(c) of the Ted Stevens Act; Congress provided that
the corporation may “serve as the coordinating body for amateur
athletic activity in the United States directly related to international
amateur athletic competition”; and “organize, finance, and control
the representation of the United States in the competitions and
events of the Olympic Games.”344 Supervision and training of athletes is further engrained in the USOPC’s By-laws.345 Under the Bylaws, an NGB will not be given NGB status unless it maintains and
executes a “strategic plan that is capable of supporting athletes in
achieving sustained competitive excellence, and in growing the
sport” and maintains and implements “effective plans for successfully training Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Games athletes.”346 These requirements are stringent. The By-laws establish
that standards and particular measures to evaluate compliance will
340

See Bria Felicien, Team USA Announces New Women’s National Team Expansion,
FANSIDED (July 25, 2019), https://highposthoops.com/2019/07/27/team-usa-announcesnew-womens-national-team-trainings-showcases/ [https://perma.cc/RNX4-CHC8].
341
See About the Colorado Springs Olympic & Paralympic Training Center, TEAM USA,
https://www.teamusa.org/about-the-usopc/olympic-paralympic-trainingcenters/csoptc/about [https://perma.cc/D6Y7-7EED]; see also US Olympic & Paralympic
Training Center in Colorado Springs, VISIT COLO. SPRINGS, https://www.visitcos.com/
things-to-do/history-and-heritage/landmarks/us-olympic-training-center-coloradosprings/ [https://perma.cc/S3SU-NYNC].
342 See USA F
ENCING ATHLETE AGREEMENT, add. A (2018–2019) (on file with author).
343
Id.
344 See 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c).
345
See U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC BYLAWS, supra note 213, § 8.7.1.
346 See id. § 8.7.1(d).
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be “set out in the corporation’s NGB Certification Standards Policy.”347 This policy details very specific compliance requirements
that the corporation’s NGB Compliance team oversees. The NGB
Compliance team may prosecute an NGB decertification action or
implement a series of compliance steps for application and develop
a set of recommended corporation compliance actions.348 These indirect measures, in addition to direct supervision and training direction that the USOPC carries out, are another way the corporation
supervises and directs the work of National Team Members.
Another matter constituting an essential term and condition of
employment is the determination of payment. While Browning Ferris analyzed “wages,”349 payment is a more appropriate category
here. The USOPC “pays” athletes indirectly by funding NGBs so
they may fund athletes.350 Less funding results in lower payments
for athletes, while greater funding results in greater athlete payments. In order for a U.S. Fencing National Team Member to receive financial support, the athlete must sign an annual Athlete
Agreement, which includes an intent to train for the upcoming
Olympic Games qualification and the completion of necessary
USOC paperwork.351 Some of the funding outlined in the agreement
is Direct Athlete Support, which is financial support that the USOC
provides directly.352 The USOPC also offers United States Olympic
Committee Elite Athlete Health Insurance for high achievers.353
The USOPC provides other types of payments as well. It “pays”
athletes by altering the consideration in their agreements. For example, in October 2019, the USOPC decided to allow American athletes to publicly thank their sponsors during the Games.354 Sponsors
can issue congratulatory messages and produce generic ads that do
347

See id. § 8.7.1.
See id. § 8.19.1.
349
See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1617 (2015).
350 See USOPC Opens Books, Gives More Detail About Sports Funding, ESPN (Aug. 3,
2020), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/29588864/usopc-opens-books-givesmore-detail-sports-funding [https://perma.cc/36DD-L9UD].
351 See USA F
ENCING ATHLETE AGREEMENT, supra note 342, add. C.
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See id.
353 See id.
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See U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., supra note 69; see also Dixon, supra note
70.
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not show Olympic and national team logos.355 They must sign a contract agreeing to penalties if they violate the terms of the new arrangement.356 The USOPC plays a very significant role in determining payment through a combination of funding NGBs, directly funding athletes, and altering what is provided in exchange for representing the United States in the Olympics.357 Therefore, under this pre2020 test, National Team Members of NGBs deemed valid employers would likely be considered jointly employed by the USOPC for
labor law purposes.
2. The Post-2020 Test
However, the Board issued a final rule that became effective on
April 27, 2020, which changed the joint employer test.358 The new
rule returns to the agency’s prior, more restrictive standard.359 Like
the employee-friendly pre-2020 test, the new rule also requires sharing or codetermining the essential terms and conditions of employment of another employer’s workers.360 However, there are several
other conditions. For one, the essential terms and conditions are explicitly listed, and at least one must be shared or codetermined.361
The conditions are wages, benefits, hours of work, hiring, discharge,
discipline, supervision, and direction.362 To share or codetermine
with regard to these terms and conditions means that the putative
joint employer must not only have the right to exercise control, but
must have actually exercised that right.363 Second, the alleged employer must exercise substantial direct and immediate control over
those terms and conditions.364 This characterization means regular,
355

U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., supra note 69.
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357 See USOPC Opens Books, Gives More Detail About Sports Funding, ESPN (Aug. 3,
2020), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/29588864/usopc-opens-books-givesmore-detail-sports-funding [https://perma.cc/36DD-L9UD].
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See NLRB Announces Final Joint Employer Rule, MINTZ (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2226/2020-02-nlrb-announces-finaljoint-employer-rule [https://perma.cc/FHV7-MVQZ].
359
See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1613–14 (2015).
360 Id.
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See NLRB Issues Joint-Employer Final Rule, supra note 171.
362 29 C.F.R. § 103.40(b) (2021).
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Id. § 103.40(a).
364 Id.
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rather than sporadic, control.365 Finally, the sharing or codetermining must meaningfully affect matters relating to the employment relationship,366 specifically making a material difference in the relationship upon consideration of the totality of circumstances.367 Unlike the Browning Ferris standard, indirect control is no longer determinative of joint-employer status but can supplement the evidence outlined above.368
Under this new standard, it will be more difficult, yet still possible for athletes to show that USOPC is a joint employer if the Board
designates the NGB as a primary and separate employer. As discussed above, the USOPC regularly determines “wages,” of funded
athletes through Direct Athlete Support programs.369 Even if the
Board refuses to understand this funding as “wages,” it still obviously “benefits”—another listed essential term and condition of employment.370 The control over funding is regularly exercised and
may be substantially direct and immediate.371 Of course, athletes
must demonstrate “direct and immediate control” that is “regular”
for each NGB through financial documentation tracing the flow of
funding from the USOPC to the athlete.372 Control over funding
makes a material difference in the relationship because without this
funding, many, if not most, National Team athletes would discontinue training. On the other hand, the USOPC can argue that funding
the NGB, which then funds the athletes, does not constitute “direct
and immediate control” because the specifics of the funding process
are determined by the NGB. The details of the funding process, and
how specifically tailored the funding is would be highly relevant to
the analysis.

365

Id. § 103.40(d).
Id. § 103.40(a).
367 See id.
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supra note 342, add. C.
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29 C.F.R. § 103.40(c)(2).
371 See USOPC Opens Books, Gives More Detail About Sports Funding, USA T
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03/usopc-opens-books-gives-more-detail-about-sports-funding/42095383/
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The USOPC likely directly determines the hours of work for
some athletes, such as at the National Training Centers and NGB
training facilities.373 Again, this control makes a material difference
in the relationship because athletes must relocate to a national training center or NGB training facility to train.374 “Hiring” and “discharging” are regularly exercised activities of the USOPC when the
it determines selection criteria.375 Of course, the USOPC can argue
it is not actually involved in hiring and discharging, but rather setting minimum standards through qualification requirements. If minimum standards do not constitute actual hiring and discharging, or
exercising “substantial direct and immediate control,” then those
terms or conditions fail the analysis. Discipline is apparently sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly controlled because actual
USOPC involvement in discipline of National Team Members appears to vary across NGBs.376 Therefore, discipline might be harder
to prove, since indirect contractual rights are insufficient under the
new rule.377 Finally, the USOPC directly and regularly exercises
material supervision and direction over athletes at national training
centers or through virtual and remote methods such as the Elite Athlete Monitoring System.378 This system allows the USOPC to make
funding and other decisions based on “athlete injuries, illnesses and
fitness.”379 It would be up to the athletes to show such remote systems are regularly used for supervision and direction to affect the
athletes in a material way.380

373

See About the Colorado Springs Olympic & Paralympic Training Center, supra note
341; see also US Olympic & Paralympic Training Center in Colorado Springs, supra note
341.
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220505(c)(3).
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JDSUPRA (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-nlrb-s-final-jointemployer-rule-34561/.

742

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:689

To summarize, the new test raises multiple questions. First, does
funding constitute “wages” or “benefits,” as listed in the new rule?
Second, is USOPC funding directly and immediately controlled?
Third, does the USOPC exercise sufficient control over hiring and
discharging? Fourth, are hours of work, discipline, supervision, and
direction directly and immediately controlled for each NGB’s National Team Members? Therefore, it is much harder for National
Team Members to satisfy the new test. In the event the Board rules
that NGBs are primary and separate employers from the USOPC,
there are fewer sports that can satisfy this test than under the pre2020 test.
C. What Is the Appropriate Bargaining Unit?
Regarding the appropriate bargaining unit, the Board may or
may not accept a bargaining unit composed of all athletes who are
National Team Members of any NGB. It may be advantageous for
athletes to apply for certification under such a broad bargaining unit
because their strike-power is particularly powerful when multiple
sports are involved. The IOC’s brand is largely dependent on hosting numerous sports at the same time.381 As a result, the threat of
National Team Members striking who are part of an NGB such as
the USAG is less threatening to the USOPC than the threat of a
multi-sport unit striking. On the other hand, athletes in the top revenue-generating sports, such as basketball, may prefer to unionize as
a separate unit. They may prioritize a favorable collective bargaining agreement that features negotiated working conditions as good
as, if not better than, the NBA’s current agreement. If they negotiate
as part of a unit with less commercially valuable sports, the result
may be a weaker bargaining position. Agreeing to worse working
conditions than the NBA would set bad precedent for unionized
team sports generally. Additionally, a large unit with employees of
differing skills and interests may create more conflicts of interest
and strains on the union’s ability to represent all unit employees

381
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fairly.382 In smaller and more homogenous units, the individual
worker is more effectively represented.383
If the USOPC and the bargaining representative cannot mutually
agree on a bargaining unit, the Regional Director would work with
the parties to define the unit.384 Section 9b of the NLRA states that
in order to assure employees have the fullest freedom to exercise
rights guaranteed by the NLRA, the Board shall decide whether the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.385 The courts
have interpreted this provision to mean the Board must only delineate some appropriate bargaining unit; not the most appropriate or
optimal.386 The Board may say that National Team Members of an
NGB are the bargaining unit, or that it is some other division, such
as a class defined by an amount range of revenue generated during
an Olympic cycle.387 It is up to the union to carefully demonstrate
why a particular bargaining unit cannot be an appropriate bargaining
unit.388
A bargaining representative seeking a larger bargaining unit can
make a strong argument in front of the Board. In determining
whether a group of employees should be allowed to act as a bargaining unit, the Board uses a “community of interest” analysis.389 A
bargaining unit’s members share a “community of interest” when
they share an interest in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.390 The Board considers the following factors: (1) similarity in skills, interests, duties, and working conditions; (2) functional
integration of the plant, including interchange and contact among
employees; (3) the employer’s organizational and supervisory

382

See GORMAN ET AL., supra note 159, at 262.
See id.
384 See id. at 263.
385 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
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See GORMAN ET AL., supra note 159, at 261.
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388 See Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 421 (2008).
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structure; (4) bargaining history; and (5) extent of union organization among the employees.391
Certainly, National Team athletes can argue their wages, hours,
and working conditions are all determined by the USOPC, irrespective of sport. Looking at the five factors, National Team Members
are all elite athletes sharing a similarity in elite athletic skills, interests, training duties, and working conditions. Even though they only
make official contact with each other at the Games, National Team
Members need each other to put on Olympic Games that encompass
many sports. The Olympics would not be the Olympics with only
basketball or even basketball, tennis, and volleyball; all the sports
are functionally integrated together. The USOPC’s organizational
and supervisory structure applies universally to all NGBs, as demonstrated by the Ted Stevens Act, USOPC By-laws, and practical organization and supervision. While there is no bargaining history or
union organization among the athletes, if they begin to organize and
bargain, these factors would be in their favor.
The counterargument may be convincing as well. The USOPC
may argue the interests and working conditions of athletes differ
drastically among different sports due to varying scales of revenuegeneration and myriad levels of control exerted on the athletes. One
can argue there is no functional integration among sports because
athletes perform in separate events and the supervisory structure differs between sports. Ultimately, since 1960, the Board has preferred
smaller units because they assure “greater homogeneity of employee
interest” and maximize “employee self-determination.”392
D. Independent Contractor Exemption to the NLRA
Perhaps the most significant hurdle to unionization is the independent contractor exemption. The NLRA explicitly excludes independent contractors.393 This analysis has been a subject of changing
case law.394 There are two important tests to consider. The more
391
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employer-friendly test, re-adopted on January 25, 2019, makes it
easier to establish independent contractor relationships.395 The older
and more employee-friendly test makes it harder to establish independent contractor relationships.396 This test pre-dates January 25,
2019, but might be adopted in the future by a more labor-friendly
Board.397 It is important to understand both tests because the Board
may make rule changes in the future that impact the analysis.
For the older, employee-friendly test, the Board and courts considered ten factors pertaining to employer control.398 Additionally,
they analyzed a putative contractor’s “entrepreneurial opportunity,”
but only when “some factors cut one way and some the other.”399
No factor is decisive and “all of the incidents of the relationship” are
assessed and weighed.400 Regarding the “entrepreneurial opportunity” tiebreaker, the courts look at whether the putative contractor
has: (1) a realistic ability to work for other companies; (2) a proprietary or ownership interest in one’s work; and (3) control over

395
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important business decisions.401 In FedEx Home Delivery v. National Labor Relations Board, the court cited Corporate Express
Delivery Systems v. National Labor Relations Board, which concluded that where a taxi company barred its taxi drivers from employing others to do the company’s work and using their own vehicles for other jobs, and the ten factors were inconclusive, the drivers
lacked all entrepreneurial opportunity.402 Therefore, the taxi drivers
were deemed employees and not independent contractors.403
In applying the common law factors to National Team Members,
some factors favor independent contractor relationships and others
do not. Some of those factors vary for different national teams. The
extent of control that the supervisor may exercise over the details of
the work differs for the USAG, for example, as opposed to USA
Fencing. USA gymnasts are controlled by USAG and USOPC
coaches and trainers in a very stringent manner.404 On the other
hand, USA fencers generally train at private fencing clubs with private coaches that are not employed by the USA Fencing National
Team or by the USOPC.405 The second factor—whether workers are
engaged in a distinct occupation or business—varies as to whether
the work is usually done under an employer’s direction or instead
by a specialist without supervision.406 The fifth factor—whether the
employer supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work—varies for different national
teams.407 The USAG likely supplies the equipment and environment
necessary for gymnastic training.408 However, USA Fencing supplies very little of that environment, or at least does so only sporadically, because fencers generally train at private clubs sanctioned by
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USA Fencing that are not funded by the USOPC, whether directly
or indirectly.409
The fourth factor—the skill required in the particular occupation—probably favors an independent contractor relationship because athletes, regardless of USOPC supervision, have a high level
of athletic skill and ability.410 The seventh factor—method of payment—also would favor independent contracting because the
method of payment is more related to “doing the job” rather than
“time.”411 Athletes are generally funded based on performance in
competition, not hours in training.412 The tenth factor—whether the
principal is in business—may favor an independent contractor relationship. The Ted Stevens Act explicitly creates the USOPC to fulfill various objectives, yet it restricts the corporation from engaging
“in business for profit.”413 Legally, if the USOPC does not engage
in business “for profit,” then the USOPC can try to argue that they
are “not in business.”414
The sixth factor—duration of employment—favors athletes.
They are employed by the USOPC in that their labor is in pursuit of
Olympic achievement through USOPC funding as National Team
Members for many years and, for some athletes, for longer than a
decade.415 The eighth factor—whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business—favors athletes because the work is absolutely part of the regular business of the employer. In fact, the
work is quite literally the central product the USOPC sells. The ninth
factor—whether the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant—may favor athletes. Assessing the tremendous
financial revenue that the USOPC acquires due to the labor of their
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athletes, and the little athletes receive in return, one can argue that
belief in the creation of a master-servant relationship exists.416
The ten factors clearly conflict. Depending on how a court or the
Board weighs each factor, a court using the employee-friendly pre2020 test may use “entrepreneurial opportunity” as a determinative
factor. Although many aspects of Olympic athletic training are akin
to the entrepreneurial spirit, the nature of the USOPC’s dominance
of amateur athletics in the United States give some athletes little-tono “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”417
In Corporate Express, the court pointed to the full-time cook and
executive, who were deemed employees—not independent contractors—because they did not have the adequate degree of economic
risk-taking with a corresponding opportunity to profit from “working smarter, not just harder.”418 On the other hand, a lawn-care provider is an independent contractor.419 In Corporate Express, the
court found that owner-operators of delivery vehicles could neither
use their vehicles for other jobs nor hire someone to drive their
route.420 Therefore, they lacked all entrepreneurial opportunity.421
Olympic athletes and hopefuls in many national teams are under
monopolistic control by the USOPC and do not have any degree of
opportunity to profit from their skills.422 USA Basketball Players
can use their skills to work for other employers, such as the NBA.
However, National Team Members in smaller sports find little opportunity away from events directly sanctioned by the USOPC or
indirectly sanctioned by the USOPC through the sport’s NGB.423 As
a result, many NGB’s National Team Members can argue they are
not independent contractors due to their lack of “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss,” at least the aspect of entrepreneurial opportunity pertaining to the acquisition of outside work.
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On the other hand, the USOPC may argue that an athlete’s job is
first and foremost to “work smarter, not just harder” and that an athlete is a great example of the “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” because he or she is compensated for discovering creative ways to score and win.
Under the Board’s new employer-friendly test, athletes are more
likely to be deemed independent contractors and not employees of
the USOPC. The new test does not affect the ten common law factors, but alters the “entrepreneurial opportunity” tiebreaker.424 Under the new employer-friendly test, entrepreneurial opportunity, like
employer control, is an underlying principle to evaluate the overall
effect of the common law factors on a putative contractor’s independence to pursue economic gain.425 This alteration decreases the
strength of the relationship characteristic from a “super-factor” to an
underlying principle.426 In the case that established the new test, SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., the Board interpreted “entrepreneurial opportunity” to mean entrepreneurial potential.427 The Board found drivers of a SuperShuttle to be independent contractors based upon their
“freedom to keep all fares they collect, coupled with their unfettered
freedom to work whenever they want.”428 The most relevant factors
in the case were extent of control, method of payment,429 and the
potential to generate more revenue through the calculated choices
each driver makes.430
In the case of National Team Members, a court applying the new
employer-friendly test would be unable to disregard the reality that
many athletes do not have the independence to use their skillset for
economic gain for another employer due to the monopolistic control
that the USOPC exerts over amateur sports.431 Certainly, some athletes, such as basketball players and star swimmers have great potential to acquire lucrative sponsorships resulting from the

424
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calculated decisions during training, which lead to medal-winning
Olympic performances.432 Many Olympic athletes in sports with
less popular appeal are unable to use their athletic abilities professionally within another sports body. In any case, a tribunal would
likely find that the USOPC exerts control, under the ten control factors, over athletes in many NGBs. Again, depending on the court or
Board’s analysis, the independent contractor exemption is likely to
exclude some athletes from unionizing, but unlikely to exclude others, depending on how the USOPC controls each NGB’s National
Team Members.
One noteworthy procedural aspect is differing standard deference courts give to agency decisions for questions concerning an
independent contractor designation. Because the Board has no jurisdiction over independent contractors whatsoever, courts will only
uphold a Board determination if they find the Board “made a choice
between two fairly conflicting views.”433 This doctrine favors appellants in situations where the Board makes decisions with which
federal courts sharply disagree due to the court’s expansive standard
of review to change the agency’s decision.434
E. The Board May Still Decline to Assert Jurisdiction Regardless
of the Employer-Employee Analysis
Even if the Board deems athletes to be statutory employees,
there are notable exceptions to the NLRA aside from the independent contractor exemption. One way to disqualify employees is by
deeming them “temporary employees.”435 Temporary employees
must be employed for one job only or for a set duration.436 In addition, they must be notified that they should not have a substantial
expectation of continued employment.437 The “temporary employees” doctrine is interpreted in a very narrow fashion.438 For example,
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one court found a scholarship athlete of four years had been playing
for too long to be a “temporary employee.”439 Another exemplary
case is the unionization effort of a group of student janitors at an arts
school.440 A court determined they were temporary employees, partially because they worked only twenty hours per week and frequently resigned441 to focus on their studies.442 Olympic athletes, on
the other hand, do not have a set duration to their employment.443
They regularly exert themselves over twenty hours per week and
rarely resign.444 Qualifying for the Olympics requires long-term
dedication and sacrifice. Further, the USOPC does not provide a
more primary service, such as the education the art school provided
the student janitors.445
There are two other ways the Board can still decline jurisdiction.
First, the Board can decline jurisdiction over any group of employees if it believes asserting jurisdiction does not promote stability in
labor relations or fundamentally interferes with broader national
policy.446 One of the ways the Board used the first declination is in
the Northwestern football players unionization petition discussed
above.447 The Board ruled that granting unionization would upset
the on-field balance of power among Northwestern’s football team
and the college football teams of the other thirteen public colleges
that play in the “Big Ten.”448 The other thirteen schools were public
and their athletes would have been unable to apply for unionization
under the NLRA.449 As a result, incoming student-athletes would
have presumably flocked to Northwestern and ignored the other
439
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ununionized teams in the conference. The Board noted this was their
only basis for declining jurisdiction.450 In fact, the Board explicitly
emphasized that their ruling had no bearing on alternative situations
where unions petition on behalf of all Football Bowl Subdivision
scholarship football players.451 The holding was limited “to the particular circumstances of this case,”452 which concerned “jurisdiction
in this single-team case.”453
However, Northwestern is distinguishable from a National
Team Member unionization effort. For National Team Members in
the United States, there would be no instability in labor relations
because the USOPC is, for many sports, the entire labor market.454
Even if the Board takes the radical step of viewing the labor market
as global—a view it has never adopted—there would be no real instability because athletes do not generally cross borders to represent
other countries.455 There is a small number of athletes who have
done so (including the author of this Note), but the number of dualcitizens is too small to create instability in labor relations.456
The second exclusion is fundamental interference with broader
national policy, which the Board generally applies to cases concerning foreign policy.457 For example, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over American employees physically based in controlled
territories out of concern for the impact on American foreign relations with those controlled territories.458 In the present case, however, foreign policy would not be affected in this way. Counsel for
the USOPC may try to argue otherwise, asserting that the unionization of Team USA athletes would negatively affect the IOC’s relationship with the USOPC. However, this argument would probably
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be irrelevant to the broader national policy exclusion because the
Board excludes based on broader American national policy. The text
of the NLRA is evidence that broader American national policy encourages collective bargaining.459
A more innovative argument the USOPC may assert is that the
United States has a broader national policy in increasing viewership
in the Games that unionization would harm.460 This argument would
be premised on the idea that viewers watch the Olympics because
they are interested in watching unpaid amateur athletes; courts have
accepted this line of reasoning in NCAA antitrust cases.461 The
Board would likely reject this argument because there is no known
broader national policy to increase viewership in the Games. The
Ted Stevens Act is concerned with increasing American participation in athletics, not necessarily viewership.462 This legislative language indicates that Congress did not intend the USOPC to concern
itself with “consumer demand.”463 And even if there is a legislative
intent to cater to “consumer demand,” the connection between consumer demand and viewership of unpaid athletes is weak.464 Most
Olympians are professionals in the sense that they are compensated
by other employers and sponsors, even if they do not receive direct
compensation from National Olympic Committees.465 Viewers
know this and watch in large numbers every Olympic cycle.466 As a
result, it would be difficult to demonstrate that collective bargaining
for direct compensation would weaken the already diluted brand of
Olympic “amateurism” in viewers’ eyes.
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All in all, the Board has plenty of policy reasons to exert jurisdiction. The purpose of the NLRA is to protect weak employees
against powerful employers.467 In this situation, there exists a weak
party of glorified, low-income workers that are financially exploited
by the USOPC.468 Unionization is a way for National Team Members of USOPC NGBs to bargain for a better structural support system and fairer compensation mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
The Board should accept a unionization bid for National Team
Members of Olympic sports that qualify for unionization as “employees” under the NLRA. Unionization would help National Team
Members improve their compensation and structural support systems. Unionizing promises a high likelihood of success for many
NGB athletes, especially considering the obstacles present through
other legal options. Unfortunately, many people balk at the idea of
economically empowering U.S. Olympic athletes. Yet, no one questions the patriotism of military personnel because they receive payment for their services. No one questions the patriotism of IOC and
USOPC executives because they earn lucrative salaries.469 So how
can people question the patriotism of athletes seeking compensation
for the services they provide? Doing so is nothing but veiled advocacy for increasing the wealth of USOPC and IOC executives. As
Mark Cuban said on the issue, “nothing is more American than getting paid for your labor.”470 Americans should support any effort by
athletes to improve their lot considering the quadrennial thrills, inspiration, and pride they provide.
Collective bargaining can help achieve a better structural support system, benefits, and compensation. The main obstacles to unionization for some NGBs’ National Team Members include the
“right of control” common law employee requirement as part of the
Board’s analysis of whether National Team Members are employees
of the USOPC. Another obstacle is the joint employment analysis,
467
468
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which applies if the NGB is deemed a separate primary employer
from the USOPC. Even if some NGBs’ National Team Members
qualify under this analysis, they must still survive the independent
contractor exemption, likely excluding some NGBs’ National Team
Members. The exemption would be due to the USOPC’s lack of adequate control of athletes, as evaluated through the ten non-exhaustive common law factors for determining independent contractor
status. Ultimately, some NGBs’ National Team Members may be
able to hurdle these obstacles, allowing for collective bargaining
with the USOPC.

